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ABSTRACT 
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to articulate and 
defend the following four hypotheses, each of which logically 
follows from the former hypothesis · and/or hypotheses. First, 
that the structure of human action is intentional, teleo-
logical and historicity-laden. Second, based upon the onto-
logical structure of human action, understanding human 
action takes the form of a narrative description (inter-
pretation). Third, because understanding human action takes 
the form of a narrative descripti6n (which is a specific 
literary genre), it follows that the process of understanding 
human action is modelled or best typified by the process 
of interpreting a narrative text. Fourth, because at its 
most basic level, the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures are a 
narrative of the Divine-human relationship, it is profitable 
to examine some of the interpretation techniques employed 
in biblical hermeneutics in order to insure that the onto-
logical structure bf both human action and narrative text is 
not betrayed or ignored. 
In the first chapter of this thesis will be developed, 
each in its turn, what we shall argue is a plausible con-
ception of intentionality, teleology and temporality. By 
ii 
"intentio ·nality" we shall mean the ontological relationship 
between persons and their world or environment. It is an 
ontological relation which is basic to the development of 
epistemology, or, more accurately, hermeneutics. The term 
"teleology" refers to that type of order which human agents 
give to actions and events to which they are intentionally 
bound. Put more simply, teleblogy shall refer to the 
logical relationship between ends and means which structures 
human action. And by "temporality" we mean the overlapping 
of past experien~e and future anticipations through the 
experience of presence . . Each of these three structures, as 
we shall see, is absolutely fundamental for the development 
of an ontology which corresponds to the agent's description 
of his own experience. Due to the complexities involved, 
the development of each structure (our ideas about each 
structure) shall remain somewhat distinct in the first 
chapter. 
Coalescence of the three structures discussed in the 
first chapter will take place in the second. There a com-
prehensive notion of "narrative understanding" will be de-
veloped. Put simply, _narrative understanding is a theory 
for the. interpretation of human action which is sensitive or 
responsive to the ontology of human being and action as ae-
veloped in the first chapter. Because the project of inter-
preting the meaning of human action as it occurs in time is 
primarily that of the historian, we will take occasion to 
iii 
apply the theory of narrative understanding to situations' 
similar to those with which the historian d-eals. In doing 
so, similarities between the process involved in inter-
preting a human action and a narrative text or chronicle 
will be evident. 
In the third and final chapter, we will simply point 
specifically in light of the work of Paul Ricoeur, to the 
plausibility of the third and fourth theses which develop. 
as a consequence of the first two. We will first attempt to 
articulate the ontological similarities between human action 
and narrative texts and specifically the autonomizing capacity 
of both. Second, the text of Scripture as the "great nar-
rative" will _receive ·special attention. Decidedly less 
original or developmental in character, the third chapter, 
as a consequence of the lack of materialsJ will perform the 
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COMPONENTS OF NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING 
Intentionality 
Brentano is the philosopher most cited as the first 
to state clearly the thesis of iritentionality: namely, that 
every cogito is fundamentally the cogito of a cogitatum. 
The relationship between the cogito and the cogitatum was 
referred to· by Brentano as "intentional." The adjective 
"intentional," for Brentano, however, was restricted exclu-·. 
sively to an intramental object and to an equally intramental 
act by the subject in his relationship to the object. 1 
Brentanois student Edmund Husserl, who developed a notion of 
intentionality which shall be of much assistance to us over 
the course of this thesis, broke with his teacher over the 
issue of the mentalistic character of intentionality. Husserl 
suggested that the significance of the intentional is not 
primarily that experience has an object but rather how it has 
an object. II perceiving is not m~rely a subjective 
passioni something that happens to the subject, but something 
a subject does to and with the world. 112 He insisted against 
1 F. A. Olafson, "Husserl's Theroy of Intentionality," 
in Husserl: Ex osition and A raisals, ed. F. Elliston and 
P. McCormic Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 160-7. 
2
E. Kohak, Idea and Experience: Edmund Husserl's 
1 
2 
Brentano that the object term of the intentional relation is 
not merely a "mental" object which bears resemblance to a 
"real" object outside consciousness. The intentional relation 
is not merely an intramental relation; "what is meant in the 
experience is th~ object itself, whether the object in ques-
tion is a tree, a mathematical state of affairs, or even the 
god Jupiter. 111 Though each object above has a different 
ontological status (a tree is ·physical, the mathematical, 
ideal, and the god Jupiter, neither), a description of the 
experience, of the relation, is not adequate qnless mention 
is made of its referent. 2 
All consciousness, Husserl maintains, is conscious-
ness of something. Before anlaysing consciousness, therefore, 
we must first discover what specifically consciousness is 
conscious of. The discovery of those essences of things by 
which any object appears to us as a "this" or a "that" is 
accomplished thr.ough what Husserl entitles an "intentional 
analysis of the acts of consciousness." From this point on, 
however, it· will be helpful if we focus our attention on the 
most important act of consciousness: the act of perception. 
Perception is perspectival: it is limited to acer-
tain viewpoint. Facing the front of my cottage, I can 
Project of Phenomenology in· Ideas I (Chicago: U. of Chicago 
Press, 1978), p. 121. 
1 
. D. Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of Bistory 
(Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1974), p. 22. 
2
Ibid., p. 22. 
3 
effectively perceive only the facade. In moving to the side, 
I alter my viewpoint by altering my position with respect 
to the cottage .. In so altering my perspective, my percep-
tions still have to do (I assume without reflection) with the 
same object, but now in a different respect. No matter how 
I may move myself around the perimeter of the cottage, so 
long as my perceptions are not obfuscated by other objects, 
I always perceive it from _a certain perspective. "The per-
ceived gives itself in and through the act of perception only 
by means of profiles (Abschattungen) which are correlated 
to a determined attitude and standpoint of the perceiver."l 
Moreover, while I am perceiving the cottage's facade I am 
aware that the other sides could and would be perceived if 
my viewpoint were to be altered. Husserl maintains' that 
each provides for a quasi-infinite number of possible pro-
files corresponding to a quasi-infinite number of possible 
2 viewpoints which the viewer can assume. 
Perceiving anything, as we have seen, involves a 
manifold of partial perceptions of the unperceived whol~. 
Each partial per~eption provide~ a profile for a certain 
perspective of the obje~t. Husserl suggests that in perceiv-
ing anything, we perceive it as a structured meaningful whole. 
As with the example of viewing my cottage, one always 
1E. Husserl, Ideas, Vol. I, trans. W. Gibson (N.Y.: 
Co 11 i er , 1 9 6 2 ) , .p p . 91 -5 . 
2 Ibid. , pp. 100-4. 
4 
e~periences the manifold of perceptions as profiles of ~y 
"complete" cottage. No one perception or profile exhausts 
the perceived thing. In fact, no particular ntimber of a 
possible quasi-infinite number of profiles are capable of 
exhausting the possible dimensions of a perceived object. 
We see, therefore, that Husserl's understanding of perception-
as-intentional is not limited to the profile actually per-
ceived but rather one which structures experience coherently 
and meaningfully. This position regarding intentionality 
(which we shall adopt in th(s thesis) is neither a reduction 
of experience to solely cognitive nor emotional states. To 
understand better how such a reduction is avoided, it will 
be useful to discuss Husserl's notions of noesis and noema. 
Noesis is a term employed by Husserl ·to · name the 
particular type of human act (perception, but also imagina-
tion, thoughts, desires, feelings, ... ) which provides a 
specific profile when a certain viewpoint is assumed. Included 
in the term noesis is also the idea that each perception of 
a certain thing aims at or has as its . end perceiving the 
object as a whole. The notion of the "whole" or "total 
meaning" of an object, that which constitutes the meaning-
. fulness of each and every act of perception~ is called the 
noema .. The noema is the meaning of the object as the mani-
fold of particular profiles fit into a connected whole. 
Perception, and consciousness is general, is a process of 
completion whereby each noetic perception confirms and 
5 
complements the others towards the noematic result that the 
subject grasps the total meaning of the object. 
H~sserl draws a further distinction concerning noesis 
and noema which is best presented in the form of a question. 
Isn't it the case that even while I perceive the facade of 
my cottage, dimensions that are not effectively perceived 
contribute to its perceptions? In other words, could I see 
the front of my cottage, could it in fact be referred to as 
"my cottage," unless I had in view much more than certain 
colors and shapes which could be said to describe accurately 
the dimensioris of its design? Husserl maintains tha~ even 
that which is only an effective individual perception is 
always perceived in a passive synthesis which is not effec-
tively perceived. Further, he maintains that the complex 
of the effectively perceived and non-effectively perceived 
perspectives constitute the meaning of the object in question. 
It is the case, therefore, that, according to Husserl, 
"consciousness (also p~rception) does not simply record; it 
is an act of rendering rational, constituting hyletic data 
(that som~thing into which we analyse a perception) as 
I 
intelligible wholes. 111 
The sense in which Husserl meant the statement "every 
cogito is the cogito of a cogitatum," has been adequately 
developed but tow~rd what cogitatum shall the cogito intend 
itself? Each and every moment we .overlook some things in 
1Kohak, Idea and Experience, p. 123. 
6 
order to be conscious of others. The objects of our experience 
are therefore intrinsically judged and valued by us for various 
reasons. Consciousness is an act which values and renders 
coherent perceptions. Hurricane winds blowing across . the 
North Atlantic mean nothing in a world devoid of conscious 
persons. Only for intentional persons who are able to per-
ceive consciously \s the stor~ meaningful. For the captain 
of a tanker crossing the same storm area of the North Atlan-
tic, the reality that he perceives is constituted in a 
frightfully meaningful whole. For a passive observer, high 
winds in the North Atlantic may mean a certain barometric 
reading. High winds and stormy seas, for the captain, on 
the other hand, mean the potential destruction of his ship, 
his crew, and his life. 
Irt the light of what has been said, the intentional 
act could be characterized as a person-world relation, which, 
in its objective reference carries a conceptual structure of 
the object perceived; it is an object which the subject con-
stitutes through appropriate syntheses. This person-world 
relation is more comprehensive than the specialized notion 
of intentionality peculiar to certain verbs; non-linguistic 
lived-bodily actions are also intentional for Husserl. 1 
Husserl's-philosophy, "thereby established a strict correla-
tion between the 6bjective and the subjective, between the 
elements in the object-domain (the world) and the intentional 
1F. A. Olafson, Dialectic of Action (Chicago: U. of 
Chicago Press, 1979), p. 
7 
activity that constructs them through the full range of 
1 judgemental syntheses proper to them." 
Teleology 
The history of historiography and philosophy is 
filled with various teleological conceptions. Traditionally, 
such conceptions have included a notion of something greater 
and somehow beyond or independent of finite human p~rposes. 
Implicit in nearly all of them is the idea of a final cause 
in history. 2 
An orthodox Christian view of history, for example_ 
that of St. Augustine, maintains that God is both supernatural 
and superhistorical. H~ arranges the cumulative sequence of 
the historical process from a position (if one can speak of 
God as "in a position") outside of time itself; in eternity. 3 
History, maintains St. Augustine among many others, is the 
arena for God's work in and through creation and especially 
human persons. He employs human persons for his own specific 
purposes. And, of course, since human persons are his crea-
tures, his purposes are really their purposes too, though 
they may not co~prehend them. Without God's incomprehensible 
purposes in history, such a history would not have a final 
teleology; no ultimate purpose . 
. 1olafson; Dialectic of Action, p. 17. 
2
Ibid., p. 8. 
3
Augustine, The Confessions, trans. R. Warner (N.Y.: 
Mentor Books, 19&3), Book X. 
8 
.Dissatisfied with the Christi~n .formulation, Hegel 
attempted to show, through the vast system_which he constructed, 
both that histori has its own teleology which transcends the 
purposeful actions of human persons and that such a teleology 
has no place for a transcendent (superhistorical) God. This 
specific teleology must transcend, he suggests, the purposes 
of human persons in order to make sense·of the ambiguous and 
confusing "ways of the world"; but it must also be truly 
immanent in history. It must be built into the historical 
process in a way that would be impossible if teleology .were 
to be equated with the will of a transcendent God. 1 The 
telos of the historical process, for Hegel, is a fully ac-
tualized conception of selfhood or spirit, but the entelechy, 
the power or reason which guides the successive stages of 
history, is logical in character. In the He~elian system as 
in the Christian, therefore, the purposeful quality of human 
action is superseded by the ultimate purposes of some final 
cause in history. 
In the end, the many efforts to conceive the process 
of history in terms of some typ~ of externally imposed tele-
ology are held in suspicion, l~rgely due. to the forced arid 
confining relationship they imply between the transcendent 
form of historical unders~an4ing held by God or acted out by 
Spirit, and the historical ~xperience of living within a 
temporal contekt. Basic to the analysis of any theory is 
1olafson, Dialectic of Action, p. 8. 
9 
its application to one's experience. Any theory which renders 
certain some distinction which each of us finds doubtful or 
which ' would render doubtful some distinction of which each 
of us is already certain will itself be regarded as doubtful. 
In this paper we shall employ a notiorr of agent 
teleology. Such a teleology of human acti6n refers td the 
logical correctness of inferri~g from 1) an agent's desiring 
that a particular end be achieved, and 2) his belief that 
some particular action is the best means to effect that end, 
therefore, 3) his action. This notion of agent teleology 
can be formulated in the following practical syllogism: 
1. X desires A. 
2. X believes that by doing~ he will achieve A. 
3. X · does B. 
Agent teleology is a (teleological) construction that attempts 
to explain accurately the common sense beliefs concerning 
human actions. It maintains that the kind of order that human 
intentions give to events iq time artd space are best under-
. stood by reference to the logical relationship, not between 
particular events and some final cause, but instead between 
the ends and means which structure human rational action. 
The question thus arises whether human action might 
be explicable in a manner other than assigning a cause to it. 
It seems quite plausible that it may. In terms of our· ordi-
nary language, we often give an explanation of particular 
actions by referring to the purposes, aims or goals of the 
10 
agent who performed them. Oftentimes, we provide such expla-
nations without any reference to a cause or causes. On a 
common sense level, actions are understood in terms of purpose. 
"The _question 'why did you do that?', which is clearly a 
request for a reason, is almost never a recital of causes. 
It is rather a request for a statement of purpose or aim. 111 
There are many who oppose this account of teleology 
on the basis that it violates the principle of extensi~nality. 
Carnap defines the principle with the following: "For every 
given (non-e~tensional) language s1 an extensional language 
s2 may be constructed such that s1 may be translated into 
s2 •
112 James Cornman, in the article "Intentionality and 
Intensionality, 11 an article which critically evaluates R. 
Chisholm's conceptions of intensionality, intentionality and 
extensionality, expands upon Carnap's def~nition by st~ting: 3 
First let us take as the extension of a declarative 
sentence its truth-value. · Thus, the truth va'lue of 
a sentence is a function of the extensions of its 
components. Second, because the truth value of such 
a sentence is a function of only the extensions of 
its components, then if a sentence is extensional, 
the replacement of one of those components by .another 
expression with the same extension, i.e., by an ex-
tensionally ~quivalent expr~ssion, will not change 
th .e truth-value of the sentence. Third, if certain 
1 R. Taylor, Action and Purpose (N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1966), p. 141. 
2 
. R. Carnap, The Lo~ical Syntax of Language (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul,954), p. 320. 
3 J. Cornman, "Intentionality and Intensionality, 11 in 
Intentionality, Mind and Language, ed. A. Marras (Urbana: U. 
of Ill. Press, 1972), pµ. 54-5. 
11 
of the components are sentential elements, i.e., 
clauses, then the truth-value of the sentence is a 
function of the truth values, i.e., extensions of the 
simple sentential elements which are its components~ 
Why is it so significant that there be untranslatable 
intensional sentences? 2 The principle of extensionality 
requires that the validity of an explanation and the truth 
claims of its premises cannot be contingent upon either the 
manner in which it is described or •~escriptions that incor-
porate a reference to the end state the occurrence of which 
3 is to be explained." If this thesis is maintained teleo-
logical explanati9ns either have no truth-value or must be 
subsumed as a specific type of extensional explanation--one 
that involves no reference to agent beliefs and purposes. 
The absence of all references allow "teleological explanations" 
to avoid violation or the requirement that the truth-values 
of the statements in the explanation be independent of the 
descriptions they use. 4 
The principle of extensionality runs into difficulty 
because not all sentences can be translated (without change 
5 in truth value) into extensional sentences. To be specific, 
not all intensi6nal sentences are able to be translated 
1cornman, "Intentionality and Intensionality," p. 55. 
2 Ibid., pp. 55-6. 
3 olafson, Dialectic of AGtion, p. 14. 
4 Ibid., p. 14. 
5 
Cornman, Intentionality and Intensionality," p. 56. 
12 
adequately into extensional sentences. The following supports 
such a claim: 
1. Kant is called the author of the Critique of Pure 
Reason because he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason. 
2. Kant is extensionally equivalent.to "author of 
Critique of Pure Reason. . 
3. Kant is also extensionally equivalent to "author of 
Critique of Practical Reason. But both (2) and (3) 
are not equivalent. Therefore, it is the case that 
either Kant is called Kant because he wrote Critique 
of Pure Reason or Kant is called the author of the 
Critique of Pure Reason because he wrote the .Critique 
of Practical Reason.,-
The derived sentence (3) is false and therefore the original 
sentence is non-extensional or intensional. 
In this thesis we shall maintain the following: 
1. Teleological explanations are incompatable with & 
purely extensional understanding of language, but 
are none the less for it. 
2. Logically, the actual meaning of a particular event 
is not independent fro~ the agent's intentions, beliefs, · 
des ires, [because] ". . .. that X's use of one descrip-
tion rather than another for the goal he seeks may be 
of central importance in connection with a determin~-
tion of what X did." 2 
We shall thus maintain that teleological explanations of cer-
tain events are capable of carrying truth-values. 
It is also argued by proponents of extensionality 
. . 
that to speak iri terms of the agent's "purpose" for this or 
that a~tion is bui one of a varietj of causal explanati6ns. 
Any such explanation is reduiible to a causal explanation. 
R. Taylor, an agent teleologist of the first order, responds 
1F~ Wenisch, University of Rhode Island. 
2olafson, Dialectic of Action, p. 14. 
13 
to this charge with the following: 
•.. this is dead wrong. If one says that he did 
something, beca·use such and such f ac tor 9 caused him to 
do it and were sue~ as to leave him no alternative, 
he is giving an explanation in terms of causes, and his 
statements are false in case those factors did not 
exist. If, on the other hand, he says that he did 
something in order that a certain end might be achieved, 
he is giving an explanation in terms of his purposes, 
and his statement is not in the least rendered false in 
the case that it is not achieved. 1 
It is perfectly legitimate to say that "I went to the store 
to buy pickles because I had a desire for them," and for it 
to be a true explanation, even though I may have returned 
home with olives instead. Purposes simply make actions in~ 
telligible; they do not cause anyone to do anything. On the 
other hand, to say that "I went to the store to buy pickles 
because two pennyless pregnant women forced·me at gunpoint," 
is a false explanation unless I was actually caused to act 
in that manner due to those particular factors. 
Agent teleologists maintain that in terms of common 
sense and ordinary language, actions ~re teleological in form 
and typically rely on the logical connection as formulated 
before in the practical syllogism to explain them. There 
seems .to be nothing to indicate that common sense is disposed 
in principle to agree that the practical syllogism should be 
reduced to a more primary non-teleological form. 
Taylor suggests that there has been a genuine confusion 
of causal explanations with explanations on the basis of 
1 
Taylor, Action and Purpose, p. 142. 
14 
purpose due to the fact that "ordinary locutions typically 
used for explaining persons' actions look for all the world 
like expressions of causality. 111 Specifical~y, the word 
"because" is used regularly in explanations of actions 
through their purposes as well as in causal explanations. 
The word "because," on the surface, appears to assign causes 
for voluntary actions. Instead, however, it can and oftimes 
does assign reasons or purposes. The assimilation of pur-
poses to causes, due to a misunderstanding of the usage of 
the word "because" or other equivalent words is a distortion 
which creates a genuinely misleading conception of human 
2 agency. 
Taylor proposes that, upon inquiry, the different 
usages of the word "because" become evident. Each expression 
below_ includes . "becausell in the expression of a causal 
relation: 
1 . Tom tripped on the step because he slipped, 
2. Tom tripped on the step because he was pushed, 
3 ~ Tom tripped on the step because it collapsed, 
and so on. 
He then compares the expressions of the first set with those 
of a second set: 
1. Tom went to the store because he wanted candy, 
2. Tom went to the store because he wished .for candy, 
1 
Taylor, Action and Purpose, p.147. 
2 Ibid., p. 148. 
1 5 
3. Tom went to the store because he desired candy, 
and 1 so on. 
For a number of reasons the expressions of the above 
two sets must be distinguished. The expressions of the second 
set are all basically equivalent and concern agent purposes; 
they all have essentially the same meaning. This is not the 
case with the first set. Each statement would, though not 
necessarily, exclude the others. These -statements are com-
plete causal explanations in themselves and not merely a 
different way of saying essentially the same. Also, the 
statements of the first set in no way lend themselves to re-
foimulations using teleological locutions. 2 Statements in 
the second set provide explanations suggesting that the '.'1gent 
was not coerced into performing the action, but instead in-
itiated it himself. The first set presents the agent as a 
victim of circumstances. In each statement in the second set 
the word "because," ambiguous as it is, is qualified with 
another word, which, ordinarily understood, provides an ex-
planation for the purpose of the action. The first set does 
not provide a wdrd describing the intention of the agent, 
but, instead, gives an explanation for the event in causal 
terms. 
To explain a person's actions by rendering a teleo-
logical account of it, as with the second set of expressions, 
1
Taylor, Action and Purpose, p. 149. 
2 Ibid., p. 149. 
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is-to represent it not as the effect of a cause but as the 
means to an ~nd. Teleological explanations provide an in-
telligible explanation for behavior and at the level of 
common sense show why the action was performed. In other 
words, it explains the action. The explanation may not be 
exhaustive but it can nonetheless be true. To allow only 
for extensional explanations for actions is to disallow the 
attachment of any truth function to a teleological account. 
_In this thesis, it shall be our position that though perhaps 
not exhaustive, teleological explanations are capable .of 
being tru~ or false and differs from the causal; that is, 
are irreducible to causal explanations. The teleological 
explanation serves to explain actions and events which could 
not be clarified with a causal model. Neither type of ex-
planation is reducible to the other. 
Temporality 
It shall be our thesis that human action is historicity-
laden. By this we mean that within human action, - which is 
always intentional and teleological are certain historicity-
laden assumptions (both past retentions and future proten-
tions). To describe an event which occurs at one time en-
t~ils that other specific events have taken place prior to it 
or will take place afterward, or bo~h before and after the 
certain event being described. Even such basic acts as the 
intentional systhesis of "home," "brother," are meaning 
constructions rooted in a battery of past and present 
17 
experiences and the protentions of a future. Absence of such 
sedimentation of experiences and meanings would render human 
experience void of all but the most basic sets of sensory 
perception. Husserl likens a present conscious act to the 
tail of a comet which trails behind it in the non-present; 
a just-passed retention that slowly fades into the past. In 
an analogous way,. present intention involves the just-about-
to-be_which has yet to be actualized. _Human action which 
occurs in presence is therefore a synthesis of a manifold 
of perceptions and-temporal complexes. It is a collecting 
together of the preceptual and temporal actual and non-actual 
in order to constitute the meaning of a particular object 
or act. 
In addition to the prospective and retrospective 
character of human experience wherein the just-passed and 
the just-about-to-be influence our experience of presence, 
the attitudes and habits developed in the distant past are 
also very present in memory. 1 Included in such attitudes and 
habits are not only the memories of "things" or "objects" but 
also the state of tonsciousness.that we previously maintained 
towards them. Thus, when I experience a certain object as 
having the meanings "dog" and "Muttsy," the present dog 
viewed in the context of past attitudes and experiences is 
!!!.Y_ dog and companion. Of course, if we wished to follow this 
1 . _· 
E. Husserl, The Phenomenolo 
Consciousnes~, trans. J. S. Churchi 
U. Press, 1964), sect. 23, 24. 
of Internal Time 
B oomington: Indiana 
18 
train of thought further we could discuss the relationship 
between intentionality and the unconscious. Instead, however, 
we shall stick to the matters at hand which shall consist of 
a brief overview of the temporal dimension of human action 
and a defense of the particular interpretation we shall 
maintain. 
Throughout the history of western thought there has 
beeri a fascination with the concept and experience of the 
present or "now" moment. In light of the prejudices tied up 
in the etymological history of the word "present," which has 
come to be understood by many as synonymous with some type 
of atomistic temporal point or monadic nub, we shall try~ 
so far as possible, to avoid its usage. Instead of trying 
to discuss time from the standpoint of abstraction, we will 
be speaking of it in terms of the subject experience of 
1 "living presence." ·Living presence, as we shall see, is that 
complex multi~dimensional grid of intentions through which 
persons experience the world. The traditional notion of the 
"present" is one that is ever entangled in the difficulty 
of speaki~g about an infinitesi~al moment. In discussing 
living pi~sence, however, we can speak of a temporal depth 
in experience. We are thus able to speak of the experience 
of living presence in the singing of a song as lasting seven 
minutes; or the listening to a record as a presence lasting 
1A term used by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 
of Perception, trans. C. Smith (N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1962), 
III: 2, "Temporal i ty." 
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one hour. From a chronological point of view, the temporal 
depth of the experience of living presence would vary greatly 
with the agent's intentions. It is the intentional meaning 
that constitutes the unity of an act. In both the singing 
of a song and the attention extended towards a speaker, the 
beginning is retained throughout the experience as a horizon 
that structures the meaning of the end. Employing a temporal 
metaphor (s) in order to illuminate how the experience of 
living presence can have temporal depth regardless of the 
fact that the subject may be undergoing many short term 
temporal experiences, Merleau-Ponty states the following: 
Hence, time, in our primordial experience of it, is 
not for us a system of objective positions, through 
which we pass, but a mobile setting 'which moves away 
from us, like the landscape seen through a railway 
carriage window. Yet we do not really believe that 
the landscape is moving; the gatekeeper ai the level 
crossing ·is whisked.by, but the hill over there scarcely 
moves at all, and in the same way, though the opening 
of my day is already receding, the beginning of my ~eek 
is a fixed point .... 1 
Living presence is a description of the experience of a living 
experienced "now" and not an att~mpt to theorize about the 
s·patial metaphor "point in time." It is the synth~sis or 
mutual harmonizing or the overlapping of lived past and· 
anticipated future through the experience of presence and 
within the horizon of the passing of time. 
In order to understand the temporal character of 
human experience, it is important that we note the temporal 
1 
M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenolo~y of Perception, trans. 
C. Smith (N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1962 , p. 419. 
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relations between lived presence and past experience. In 
the following diagram, designed by Huss~rl, we are able to 
see how events which occurred in the past can be experienced 
i 1 . . 1 n 1v1ng presence. 
A B C D E 
' " ' ' ' " ' ' ~1 ' '13 1 " ' ' " " " ' ' ' " '- A2 ' " " ' ' " " ' ' " 
The horizontal line moving from right to left (E-A) represents 
a traditional chronological time graph which displays the 
progreision of moments from future to past. A2 and B1 
represent the retention of past events A, A 1 and B in lived 
presence which is repre~ented by the vertical lirie C. In 
this diagram, Husserl fills out, as it were, the temporal 
depth of the actual experience of presence as opposed to the 
abstracted, chronological and momentary present. C, rather 
than being expressed merely as an infinitesimal point, repre-
senting a "now" which is ever a ''then II or a "not yet' II is 
the time wherein A is retained as A2 and Bis retained as B1 • 
The te~poral complexity of human action includes not 
only past but also future referr~ng assumptions. Though 
Husserl failed to note, on his diagram, the protention or 
1Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Con-
sciousness, p. 49. 
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future in human action, those following after him, Heidegger 
for instance, have noted the future referring character of 
living presence. Below is a helpful diagram of both reten-
1 tion and protention within the subject's living presence. 
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Like the previous diagram, the movement from point E to 
point C represents movement from the future to the present 
and from point C to point A, movement from the present to 
the past. At point C, it is also the case that the just-
2 1 ( -1 -2 passed (A and B ) and the anticipated future D . and E ) 
are imbedded in presence. 
Through the brief overview of temporality provided 
thus far, it has been our intenfion to introduce general 
conGepts and emphases for an interpretation of human action 
that takes temporal reference in ordinary language and 
experience as fundamental to human being. In so doing, we 
1G. Johnson, of University of Rhode Island, is 
responsible for above graph. 
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are working on the assumption that there is an ostensible 
logical connection between the agent's description of a past 
experience or future protention and his present action. 
Thus, to say that "I am eating my twelfth pancake in a row,'' 
would be a true description only if, prior to the pancake I 
was presently eating, I had eaten e1even pancakes sequen-
tially. Or if I said, while eating the fifth pancake in a 
row, that, "I am eating fifteen pancakes in a row today," 
the truth of the description of the present would depend· 
upon the prespective description of the future. All that 
has been sh6wn in this discussion is that in some cases the 
truth of the description of the present moment is dependent 
on past and future references. It has not been shown for 
all cases of descriptions having a temporal reference. In 
the next section, when we examine narrative understanding, 
it shall, however, be our thesis that the historicity of 
human action is both retrospective and prospective and that 
in order to understand fully the meaning of an action it 
must be contextualized within the larger horizon of the entire 
matrix of intentions. 
The proponents of the resolutive thesis ask whether 
the many possible events that appear imbedded into each 
particular event can be "sundered neatly and nonresidually 
into its consitutents? 111 One such proponent, Bertrand 
1
A. Dante, "Complex E:'"ents," in Langua~e and Human 
Nature, ed. P. Kurtz (St. Louis: W. H. Green, 971), p. 228. 
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Russell, poses a similar question in his famous example of a 
world that comes into existence with a population that has 
full blown memories of a past it never had: namely, is it 
possible to decontextualize temporally all events and find 
. meaning (of some sort) in them as atomistic units? 1 The 
resolutive .theorists maintain that complex descriptions are 
capable of such atomistic resolution. They suggest that 
instead of the original descript_ion stating "the twelfth 
pancake in a row," we should have multiple statements describ-
ing the consumption of individual pancakes. In each case we 
would be concerned to describe what took place at each dis~ 
crete moment independent of any other event at any other 
time. Further, they maintain that the technique of providing 
ostensible logical connections between events would be viewed 
as merely a convention for expressing certain empirical rela-
tions which exist between such events. Complex events, there-
fore, cannot carry a truth value. Before settling this 
issue, let us first discuss whether or not the resolutive 
thesis is capable of adequately describing human action and 
specifically the intentional di~ension that is so clearly 
displayed in the retrospective and prospective activities 
of human persons. 
The resolutive thesis appears'to have significant 
shortcomings with its d~scription technique of eliminatin~ 
1B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind (N.Y.: Macmillan, 
1921), p. 159. 
24 
all ostensible connections between events. This becomes 
quite apparent as we examine the very basic function of 
memory-belief. 
I may remember that I promised to pick my brother up 
at the softball field at eight o'clock. To make such a 
promise is to perform a conscious intentional act. To main-
tain that I remember such an action is to claim to be in . 
continuing contact with my own past conscious experience. 1 
In making such a claim, I am, in effect, yoking together two 
truth statements describing two discrete events ln time--the 
act of remembering in the present and the past act of promis-
ing. I am thus actually claiming that a logical connection 
exists between the two statements so as to compose an indi-
visible complex event. 
To avoid the conclusion of positing a complex event, 
those who support the resolutive thesii hold that the notion 
of a logical connection between the original action in the 
past and the present act of memory does not exist. It would 
only appear to be a necessary connection, therefore, because 
one cannot alter a past event. · The memory.claim, which is 
believed in the present, must be weakened and restated so 
as to be consistent with the grammar of belief. In so doing 
it is made congrouou _s with the possibility that I may not 
have made any such promise to my brother at any particular-
time in the past. Further, "I must not only accept as a 
10lafson, Dialectic of Action, p. 83. 
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logical possibility that this memory-belief may be false; 
I must also be prepared to redescribe it and all my other 
memory-beliefs in a way that is consistent with this possi-
bility.111 A memory belief is to be treated as an event like 
any other event that takes place at a certain time, and the 
"that" clause is to be treated as non-referential. 2 
Olafson suggests that the greatest difficulty in-
volved in the approach the resolutive the~is takes toward 
temporally complex events is the manner in which it deals 
with referential language that refers to past or future 
events. He states: 
If the act of reference has always to be described . 
in teims that effect a logical separation between 
that act itself and the event or . state of affairs 
that is referred to, it is not clear how this can 
be done without at the same time suppressing the 
internal relatedness that acts occurring at one 3 moment in time may have to other moments in time. 
Such a thesis homogenises all temporal references by denying 
the logical interrelatedness of events which occur during 
different temporal phases. The ontological status of the 
predicates (memories and /or prospections) has n6t been 
satisfactorily explicated with the logical notations which 
refuse to provide . for intentional grammar locutions (i.e., 
something as basic as a "that" clause).· 
There have been numerous attempts to articulate the 
1olafson, Dialectic of Action, p. 84. 
2 Ibid. , p. 84. 
3 Ibid., p. 84. 
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features of memory by lqgical positivists, empiricists, 
materialists, each of which fail to take into consideration 
the intentional dimension of memory-beliefs. The logical 
positivists fall into the difficulty discussed above; the 
act of reference has always to be described in a proposi-
tional form that effects a logical separation between, say, 
"remembering" and the referent remembered. 1 Classical 
empiricism, when discussing memory, postulates the existence 
of certain ideas and/or images in the mind. But once again, 
with this view, the question arises how such images take on 
the trait of images of a particular past event. Materialiits 
likewise run amuck by explicating the ontological status of 
the predicates in terms of some physical theory such as 
behaviorism or neurophysiological theory, due to the fact 
that the words which compose the predicates are translated 
into non-linguistic present material events. How to derive 
reference to past events from present non-linguistic behavior 
is a difficulty they appear to be unable to resolve satis-
factorily at present. 
Without going into any further analysis of particular 
theses developed, we shall press the question concerning the 
plausibility of the "guiding principles" of the resoluti,ve 
thesis. From exactly what temporal position is the resolu-
tive thesis issuing its limiting decrees? 
1 N. Malcolm, Memory and Mind (Ithaca: Cornell U. 
Press, 1977), pp. 203-4. 
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Unless the model too is collapsed into its own specious 
present, the references it involves to the original 
event in the series as well as the references to that 
same event that are implicit in the restrictions im-
posed on the descriptions of the mental events that 
follow upon it cannot be bracketed or neutralised in 
a way that events in the model are. They must be 
taken instead at full strength or the claim they involve 
will be transformed into the present experience of a 
claim in just the way that the episodes of remembering 
were transformed into the contents of so many suc-
cessive prisents. 1 
We shall maintain therefore, in this thesis that any 
model of human action that can ·be constructed must be devised 
from within history itself and must be faithful to the agent's 
common sense description of his own actions. The resolutive 
model fails to conform to either rule. Within that model 
there is an unresolvable difference between the person who 
is within the model (one who is stripped of all capacities for 
making temporal references that refer to something) and the 
person who employs the model. This person, the employer, 
constantly makes references to past and future events. It 
is only the person being described by th~ model that has all 
references to a different temporal phase described in such 
a way that it signifies his pres~nt believing .contrary to 
his own description of what he would understand himself to be· 
doing. There is therefore an illegitimate denial of equi-
valence between the person being described and the person 
describing. 
1Malcolm, Memory and Mind, p. 86~ 
CHAPTER II 
NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING 
In this chapter we shall develop as best we can a 
conception of Verstehen (understanding) that has its basis 
in the notions of intentionality, teleology and temporality. 
Intentionality, as we spoke of it in the last chapter, is the 
pairing of noesis and noema: the construction of a person-
world relation via the synthesis of the structures of human 
consciousness (noesis) and the world perceived (noema). 
Teleology was referred to as the kind of order that human 
intentions give to actions in space and time. Specifically, 
we suggested that teleology is best understood by referring 
to the logical relationship not between particular events 
and some final cause, but, rather, between ends and means 
which structure human rational action. And, temporality 
was understood to mean that synthesis or mutual harmonizing 
or overlapping of the past as lived and ~nticipated future 
within the experience of presence and the horizon of the 
passing of time. The particular conception of Verstehen 
which we shall now work toward developing will be called 
· ''narrative understanding.'' By narrative understanding we 
shall mean that: because human action is temporally complex--
28 
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having reference to both the future and the past--to under-
stand the meaning of a complex human action or event requires 
that it be "framed" as it were in the context of those other 
' 
past and future references in a manner that is correlative 
to its location in the agent's own life. 
As a vehicle for comprehending what we mean by the 
term -"narrative understanding," let us briefly examine a 
criticism of Verstehen that wa~ presented by the well known 
social scientist Theodore Abel. Abel's thesis against 
Verstehen is as follows: II that the method of under-
standing or Verstehen has at best a heuristic value in thai 
it suggests possible explanations for some human actions 
while lacking any.means for the critical evaluation or veri-
1 fication of the hypotheses which it generates." He provides 
an illustration to substantiate his thesis. On one pa~ticu-
lar inclement day observer (O) notes that his neighbor (N) 
leaves his house, chops several logs of wood, returns inside 
his house with the cut wood in his arms and proceeds to 
ignite the ·wood in his fireplace. (0) concludes that due 
to the low temperature outside (N) "began to feel chilly 
and in order to . get warm lit a fire. 112 Such an interpreta-
tion, Abel argues, is inconclusive in view of the quasi-
infinite possible motives (N) may have had in chopping the 
1 . 
T. Abe 1, "The Operation _Cal led Vers tehen, 11 in 
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl and M. 
Brodbeck (N.Y.: Appelton-Century Crofts, 1963), pp. 677-8. 
2 rbid., p. 679. 
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wood on that particular day. He may have merely wanted to 
get some exercise or gather various wood samples is order 
to test their different burning temparatures. In fact even 
if (N) told us why he cut wood on that particular occurrence 
it would not be sufficient because he may be lying or his 
motivation may have been unconscious. Verstehen, Abel 
suggests, 
... Thus typically involves a · translation of items 
of observed behavior into internal "feeling states" 
which have accomplished such behavior in one's own 
case; and we generalize this experienced sequence 
in a "behavior maxim" which we then apply to another 
case like that of the neighbor who builds a fire .. 
the inference we thereby make is causal in character 
and •.. is based only on association in our own 
experience for which no wider statistical warrant has 
been established. Understanding as such provides no 
"verification" or "objective validity" for the "be-
h • , 111 · av1or maxim. 
indeed. 
Abel's treatment of his own example is very suspicious 
In his argument he has insisted on substituting 
internal "feeling stat _es" in place of the various actions 
which (N) performed. The result of such a translation is 
that the equivalent internal stat~s are impossibl~ to 
context~alize temporally in order to be interpreted meaning-
fully and fail to enable one to do more than merely note 
their chronological order. Furthermore, Abel's criticism 
that Verstehen's, (what we call narrative understanding), 
is only of heuristic value, lacking a schema for verification, 
is effective only if one supposes that the narrator or 
1olafson, Dialectic of Action, p. 198. 
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historian is somehow able to transcend temporal experience 
and postulate explanations from a (some) detached position. 
We shall return to discuss in further detail the plausibility 
of this suppositio~, but, as concerns Abel's argument above, 
we shall argue that in light of the intentional relation 
between (N) and the wood and the temporal context of (N's) 
actions, there is no necessity to accept AbelJs subjective 
and ultimately skeptical position. The meaning of the action 
can be discovered by adequately narrating the events which 
took place. The heuristic value of the narrative emerges 
as the temporal context braodens. "Verstehen," therefore, 
"is best when we have a long-term stretch of situated action 
to understand; it is poorest when a slice of opaque action 
ts abstracted from its situation and duration. 111 In fact, 
it is essential in order to have a narrative description 
that the sentence Cs) d~scribing the event refer to either a 
past or anticipated future term or phrase.which in turn 
describe events which have occurred or are anticipated. The 
narrative sentence therefore describes a present action in 
light of one of those two or both tensed· terms. To simply 
say that "At time (t 2 ) (N) cuts four logs," would neither 
be a narrative description nor informative as to the "why" 
or intentional structure involved. However if at time Ct 1 ) 
(N) was shivering inside his house and at time (t 3 ) he was 
1G. Johnson, "Historicity, Narratives, and the Under-
standing of Human Life," Journal of the British SocietY for 
Phenomenology, p. 10, (forthcoming). 
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gaily warming himself in front of a roaring blaze, the 
narrative would begin to take shape and the plausibility of 
the description substantiated. 
Remember what we stated in our discussion of teleo-
logy: namely, that in avoidance of the indefinables involved 
in working out the relationship between the ultimate telos 
or subject of historical understanding (as presented in the 
writings of the great teleological thinkers such as Aug~stine 
and Hegel) and our own individual and collective experience 
(the awareness of ourselves as temporal), we held that basic 
to the analysis of any theory is its application to ourselves. 
We are working with (based upqn argumentation) a notion of 
agent teleology and therefore when, in retrospect, we examine 
various human events which have transpired, we presume that 
the particular type of ordet' that human intentions give to 
events in time and space is best understood by reference 
to the logical relationship between the ends_ and means which 
structure human rational action. In one sense, therefore, 
Verstehen or narrative understanding i~ not sufficient.to 
provide some "final verification." or "objective validity" 
to substantiate its interpretation of historical events. 
Rather, it aims at an interpretation that provides the most 
inclusive ~nd intelligible explanation for human events and 
at the level of common sense attempts to explain why the 
events occurred in this or that manner. 
Another convenient way of speaking about descriptions 
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which exhibit the structure of narratives is that of the 
whole-parts relationship; or the relationship between indi-
vidual actions and the larger temporal context in which they 
reside. For example in Roland Bainton's Erasmus of Christen-
dom, Bainton informs us that: "In May of 1515 he [Erasmus] 
wrote to Cardinal Riario on behalf of Reuchlin, a man venerable 
and venerated, of unsullied reput~tion, esteemed by the 
Emperior . Maximilian, deserving of an abundant harvest from 
his noble studies in which he is preeminent in Germany. 111 
The explanation of why Erasmus wrote on behalf of Reuchlin 
to the Cardinal Riario is not present in the above descrip~ 
tion. Provisions for an explanation take form, however, if 
we examine Bainton's comments which describe more fully the 
temporal context of Erasmus' action. Bainton informs us that 
one of the important sub-issues at stake in Luther's Ninety-
Five Theses of 1517 was the "continuation of a controversy 
already well advanced between the humanists and the obscu-
rantists over the question of freedom to pursue the study 
of Hebrew literature. 112 . Principal characters in the debate 
were John Reuchlin--a leader in .Hebrew studies amdng Chris-
tians--and John Pfefferkorn, a newly c9nverted Jew and zealot 
for the destruction of all Jewish booki. M~ximilian fits 
into the story as it was he who established a committee in 
1 . 
R. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom (N.Y~: Scribner's 
Sons, 1969), p. 151. 
2 rbid., p. 151. 
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order to establish the issues of ·the debate. Erasmus involved 
himself because of his designs for an education program which 
would promote the study of Hebrew through the Collegium 
Trilingue at Cologne. The larger the temporal context, the 
more details are highlighted and grasped as hav{ng a particu-
lar meaningful role in characterizing the overarching temporal 
framework. 
The smaller the temporal context, such as our first 
mention of Erasmus' letter, the more shallow the explanation, 
the larger the deeper. The ideal exampte of narrative under-
standing could be described as the program of perpetually 
enlarging the temporal context of the action including within 
that context all other "variables" that in some way pertain. 
' 
Ultimately, this is an infinite task which encompasses not 
only the historical subject's life world and the narrator's 
life world but also the entire history of all human life 
worlds~ Certainly it is obvious that our brief example is 
an incomplete interpretation of Erasmus' response to the 
debate which was ~nsuing at that time. To explore more 
fully his career in the church,.his work in both ancient and 
modern languages and his influence upon the universities of 
his time would further deepen the narrative. A description 
of the contribution which he made to his period in history 
and reflection upon the effects of his publications on the-
history of western civilization would add yet more to the 
quality of the narrative. By understanding better the period 
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in which Erasmus lived we understand better his activities 
within his environment; by understanding his activities better 
we understand more deeply why the early Enlightenment and 
Reformation were, to some extent, as they were. By under-
standing the context we better understand the action and by 
understanding the action and its consequences we understand 
the context more fully. 
The name "hermeneutic circle" was used by the philo-
sopher-historian Wilhelm Dilthey to describe the movement 
fro~ part to whole and back again which we iaw exhibited in 
our effort to better understand Erasmus' action of writing a 
letter. Take for example a sentence. The meaning of a 
sentence is dependent upon the meanings -of individual words 
yet the meaning of each word is dependent upon its relation 
to the others in the sentence. In the same way a sentence 
has meaning as it is placed within a paragraph and the meaning 
of the paragraph is dependent upon the individual sertences. 
As with out example of Erasmus' letter, in each case the 
meaning of the individual term (action; event, word) is 
better understodd and more adeqtiately interpreted as the 
temporal horizon enlarges. 
Dilthey's profundity is evident not only in his being 
the first to articulate the hermeneutic circle, but further 
in his position that it was implausible to speak of narrative 
history without attending to the contribution of the narrator. 
Bainton states that upon writing his letter in behalf of· 
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Reuchlin " ••. Erasmus made it entirely plane that he was 
not endorsing Reuchlin's Cabalistic speculations which he 
regarded as sheer fantasy ... the cause of Erasmus was 
clear. He would defend Reuchlin's freedom without endorsing 
everything for which he stood. 111 Yet those who were contem-
poraries of Erasmus interpreted his actions in extremely 
different ways. Bainton states that Erasmus' course of 
defending Reuchlin on the principle of liberty and particular 
religious views "drew upon him distrust from both sides. 112 
The Dominicans who ~ttempted to overthrow Reuchlin in favor 
of Pfefferkorn viewed his act as contemptuous and attempted 
to suppress his work for the development of languages in the 
universities while the "lusty young humanists" viewed his 
actions as a mockery of the Dominican monks and those who 
tried Reuchlin. 3 
In both cases due to their own presuppositions and 
religious or philosophi~al commitments, the actions of Erasmus 
were construed differently. Because the narrator or inter-
preter is likewise involved in a hermeneutical cirlce, the 
first being the parts-whole dialectic of the event described 
by the interprete~, one must therefore speak of the hermeneu-
tic circle characteristic of historical understanding as double~ 
Prior to performing an action, agent (A) has certain past 
1 . 
Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom, p. 152. 
2 Ibid., p. 152. 
3 rbid., pp. 132-3. 
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and future referring assumptions concerning the meaning of 
the action. At the moment in which (A) perfoims the action 
he understands it in a way which may be very different from 
when he is able, in retrospect, to place his action in a con-
text with other actions and events. This is due to the fact 
that the action is able to be situated within a context which 
includes many events that were impossible to anticipate at 
the time of the performance of the action. 
Erasmus at the time when he wrote the letter on 
behalf of Reuchlin, may have perceived his action as ages-
ture on behalf of freedom for academic pursuits and especially 
for the academic affairs of those universities to which he 
was associated. Later, however, at the time when Luther 
was engaged in debate with Erasmus' foes, the Dominicans, 
with the issue of free speech as the central principle in 
dispute, Erasmus may have looked back upon the small effort 
of writing·a letter on behalf of a fellow scholar as the 
first step in clarifying what could be considered the central 
issue of both the Reformation and the Enlightenment; i.e., 
freedom of expression. 
It is clear, therefore, that narrative understanding 
is ~oncerned not 6nly with the historicity-laden intentionality 
of the historical subject under historical analysis but also 
with the historicity-laden intentionality of the narrator -
or historian. The process involved in ichieving narrative 
und~rstanding, in light of the double hermeneuti~~ has been 
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a subject which has concerned recent philosophers of history. 
We shall discuss briefly the work of two such philosophers, 
R. G. Collingwood and H. G. Gadamer, who have written im-
pressively on how exactly this process of narrative under-
standing takes place. We shall begin with Professor Colling-
wood. 
Collingwood, in his classic The Idea of History, 
maintains that historical understanding has a specific logic 
of question and answer. 1 The hermeneutic rhythm of question 
and answer is initiated from within the . context of the 
narrator's pre-understanding, and particularly his pre-
understanding of the retro~pective whole within which a par-
ticular action took place. For instance, in the preface to 
Bainton's work on Erasmus, Bainton states: 
I shall probably never have undertaken this assign-
ment were Erasmus lacking in contemporary relevance. 
He is important for the dialogue which he desired 
never to see closed between Catholics and Protestants. 
He is important for the strategy of reform, violent 
or non-violent ...• The more intolerant grew the 
contenders, the more he recoiled and strove to 
mediate. He ended as the battered Liberal. Can it 
ever be . otherwise? This is precisely the problem of 
our time. 2 
This statement and others like it reveal Bainton's pre-
understanding of the world of Roman Catholic and Protestant 
debate and Erasmus' role as mediator. Further, now that we 
understand Bainton's pre-understanding of the retrospective 
1R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (N.Y.: 
Oxford U. Press, 1977), pp. 269-82. 
2R. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom, p. viii. 
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whole (the context of Erasmus' life and actions) we can 
understand why he would interpret Erasmus' position with 
regard to Reuchlin as one which strove for mediation between 
racist fanaticism on the part of the Dominicans and super-
stition on the part of Reuchlin. Such an interpretation of 
the particular act was wholly consistent with his (Bainton's) 
pre-understanding. (This is not to suggest, however, that 
Bainton's pre-understanding was not well informed and supported 
by evidence.) 
Though the logic of question and answer begins with 
pre-understandirig on the part of the narrator the particul~r 
pre-understanding grows and changes as the questions which 
the narrator poses become informed by the prospective meaning 
context of ·the human event which occurred. With the new 
information which is gained in response to the narrator's 
question the original question is reformulated . so as to be 
more specific in its probing to understand better the occur-
rence itself. A good question is one that leads not only 
to an initial answer, it is one that also leads on to another 
specific question, an improved q,uestion that leads to an 
. d d 1 improve answer, an so on. 
What assumptions Ls one making concerning the ori-
gins of the question answer dialogue wheri it is proposed 
that the hermeneutic rhythm of qu~stion and answer is 
initiated from within the context of the narrator's pre-
1 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 269-82. 
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understanding? Questions come into being when what we assume 
to be the case concerning something and information about 
the object of our assumptions conflict. At first when the 
historian initiates his questions toward the historical text, 
or other various evid2nces, his questions are deeply imbedded 
in his own historicity-laden assumptions (both reflective and 
unreflective) about a particular action or event in the past. 
That is to say, that the pre-understanding creates or pro-
vides us with certain questions as opposed to others. Im-
plicitly, it is also suggesting that "pre-understanding" has 
itself~ narrative structure. 1 
A more simplified way of making our point is to say 
that the initial question which a historian asks about a 
historical event greatly reflects the historian's own growth 
as one having a certain pre-understanding and, specifically 
in this case, training in history as an academic discipline. 
Not only are. such factors relevant in understanding why cer-
tain questions are favored over others and why some questions 
are never formulated by some historians, but also in under-
standing the factors involved iri the selection of one 
particular question for one particular historical period 
and not another. This sort of "selectiveness" evidences 
certain assumptions which the narrator is maintaining about 
the effectiveness or appropriaten~ss of one period of history 
to answer his question over·agaihst some other epoch. Of 
1Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 337. 
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course the extent to which our inherited prejudices affect 
the "selecting" process and the practical effects a biased 
selecting process has upon the outwoiking of historical 
research are complex topics d~serving much more space than 
we have provided. In general, however, we shall call this 
process of reciprocity whereby the text of human event and 
the historian interact and make increasingly more specific 
demands upon each other the hermeneutic of question and 
answer. 
The philosopher H. G. Gadamer has been very influen-
tial in developing the notion of what we have thus far ref~rred 
to as the pre-understanding of the histori~n. He has irr 
Truth and Method written a great deal on an area which we 
have already mentioned, namely; th€ narrative structure of 
"pre-understanding. 111 · True to both Dilthey and Collingwood 
(at Collingwood's finer moments), Gadamer argues persuasively 
for the historicity-laden character of every eff6rt to achieie 
understanding of the inherent teleology within human ev~nts, 
actions, literary texts or aesthetic objects. 2 Like 
Heidegger before him, Gadamer links the intentional relations 
between persons and the world with temporality through the 
historicity-laden structure of language. Our understanding 
of the world, he maintains, is determined by our intentional 
relations with it. This relation however has a fore-structure 
1 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 
2 collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 236-7. 
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of concepts which are rooted in the language we learn and 
employ as we grow toward death. We are "thrown" in to thE: 
world and the world into which we have been thrown is fun-
damentally linguistic. In this "linguistic world" which 
composes a particular world view or tradition of approaching 
the world and which exists at a certain period in history, 
we are equipped with the means to understand our environment. 
What an-other's action means is interpreted, says 
Gadamer, by the narrator within the cont~xt of the narrator's 
own historically situated perspective and with the conceptual 
"g~ar" of that particular chang ing-:-growing-horizon. It is 
thus impossible to offer a purely objective, atemporal,. 
transcendent or prejudice-free description of what "actually" 
took place. This shall be argued more extensively in our 
discussion on distanciation. 
An interesting question which we cannot take up in 
this thesis is whether or not is is adequate to describe the 
life-worlds or traditions into which we are "thrown" invol-
untarily as "fundamentally linguistic." Is it not the case 
that involved in membership in ~ny particular tradition of 
approaching one's world are included many non-linguistic 
emotions, perceptions and experiences, or, at minimum, ones 
which are not primarily linguistic? An extensive study of 
the development of hermeneutic philosophy and especially the 
differences between the 20th Century French and German 
traditions would be informative concerning this question. 
\ . 
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Two Important · IsBues 
At this juncture in our discussion there are two 
important issuei which should be elaborated more fully. First, 
Gadamer distinguishes between an interpietation giving rise 
to a genuine understanding from one blindly biased by one's 
own prejudiced pre-understanding. This distinction, of 
course, will require that we discuss briefly not only the 
differences between an authentic and an illegitimate inter-
pretation but also the larger issue of connaturality: namely, 
that narrative understanding is possible even when the pre-
understandihg of the historian is radically different fro~ 
the perspective represented in the text ot action under study. 
Second, most hermeneutic thinkers fail to distinguish ex-
plicitly between the historical chronicle, which is often 
construed as exemplifying a mode of understanding, with 
describing the "actual" events which occurred and the 
historical narrative produced as an interpretation of the 
historical events in accordance with the structures of the 
agent (intentionality, teleology and temporality). It shall 
therefore be of interest to us to examine why this distinc-
tion is suspect by various philosophers. We shall continue 
by discussing each of these issues in the order in which they 
have ·been introduced. 
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Authentic and Illegitimate Interpretations (Connaturality) 
Gadamer makes the point that "Alles Verstehen i ·s 
Auslegung: 1·1 all understanding is interpretation. 1 Yet he 
also maintains that there is a difference between an inter-
pretation which actually refers to and dialogues with an 
other . (be it a text, person or action), and a pseudo-form of 
understanding which manipulates the meaning of the object of 
historical interest without any actual reference to the ob-
ject itself. Gadamer supports the position that there is such 
a thing as an illegitimate interpretation. An illegitimate 
interpretation would occur when the historian or narrator 
imposes upon the object of historical interest the conceptual 
structures 6f his own pre-understanding without any genuine 
effort to dialogue with the "other. 11 In so doing the 
historian avoids confrontation with the actual historical 
object with which dialogue may in fact imply a meaning sub-
stantially different from the one imposed upon it. The 
interpreter's failure to interpret the object or event under 
analysis in a manner appropriate for the ontological struc-
tures evident in the object, is ' correspondingly a . failure 
by the interpreter to render a legitimate interpretation. 
The principle proof or evidence which Gadamer employs to 
bolster the distinction between an ·authentic ' and an inauthen-
tic or illegitimate interpretat ·ion is that the dialogue 
1 D. Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literar , Historical 
and Philoso~hical Hermeneutics Berkeley: U. of Cal .. Press, 
19 78) , p. · 5 . 
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between the historical subject and object can in fact and at 
times does have the effect that geniune alterations ~re made 
in the position held by the historian. It is wholly different 
in the case of the historian who, blind to the object's 
ontological structure, manipulates the meaning of the action 
in order to make it consonant with the assumptions of his 
tradition. In this case absolutely no alteration of view-
point is required or expected on the part of the narrator. 
Gadamer concludes that in actual practice the interpretive 
dialogue between the narrator and the historical object is 
one which ever fluctuates between an 'emphasis on the fore-
structured, pre-understanding received through tradition and 
the legitimate understanding achieved when the narrator con-
fronts the ontological structures of the object and subse-
quently is compelled to alter his position in correlation 
with the information presented. The degree to which the 
narrator fluctuates between these two poles of emphasis would 
be critical in evaluating the authenticity of the interpre-
tation produced. 
Of course, one argument ' against Gadamer's "validation 11 
of an authentic interpretation is that one could alter one's 
hermeneutic apprciach toward an historical object, in response 
to the ontological status of that particular "other," and 
yet be no closer to ascertaining a more correct interpretation 
than before such alterations. Such an argument is effective 
in case either that: 1) the adjustments which the interpreter 
46 
has made in his interpretation are mistaken and fail to 
correspond to the specific ontological structure of the 
object, or, more seriously, 2) that the entire subordination 
of epistemology to ontology is an erroneous philosophical 
position. S~ch a position maintains that the. ontological 
st~tus of the subject of inquiry prescribes itself how it is 
to be understood and that epistemology or hermeneutics must 
b~ the subordinate effort responsibly to develop a way of 
interpreting the meaning of the human world as subject matter. 
To attempt to deal systematically with the latter argument 
would require a second thesis beyond this one. We shall, 
however, take up an aspect of the questio~ in our upcoming 
study·of "distanciation" or critical distance, in this 
chapter. With regards to the first argument, we c~n affirm 
the possibility of error in the hermeneutic approach and 
simply reply that in reaction to such error corrections c~n · 
and should be made. 
Gadamer maintains that authentic interpretation (i.e., 
narrative understanding) can be attained regardless of apparent 
differences in the pre-understanding of the narrator and the 
historical object. This is due to the fact that the generic 
structures of intentionality, teleology and temporality are 
shared by all human beings. At the same time, Gadamer states 
in Truth and Method, that he opposes the thesis of connatu-
rality. Such a thesis maintains that in order for genuine 
understanding to take place, there must be specific shared 
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ontological structures between the interpreter and that 
which is interpreted. His rejection of connaturality is 
quite explicit in the following quote: 
It is quite mistaken to base the possibility of 
understanding a text on a postulate of 'connaturality' 
that s'upposedly unites the creator and the interpreter 
of a work. If this were really the case, then the 
human sciences would be in a bad way. The miracle of 
understanding, rather, consists in the fact that no 
connaturality is necessary to recognize what is really 
fundamentally meaningful in a tradition. We are ~ble 
to open ourselves to the superior claim 1the text makes and respond to what it has to tell us. 
In rejecting the thesis on connaturality Gadamer 
illegitimizes his thesis that interpreters are able to "op~n 
themselves" and "recognize what is really significant and 
fundamentally meaningful" in the object he is interpreting. -
He illegitimitizes his thesis unless it can be shown, which 
' it easily can, that Gadamer is rejecting one articulation of 
connaturality in favor of a better one. The form which he 
is rejecting is precisely that of Schleiermacher's. The 
factor which makes interpretation possible, according to 
this schema, is the capacity of the interpreter to rediscover 
the subjectivity of the author and his intended meanings in 
the text or event itself. Gadamer rejects the identification 
of connaturality wiih the claimed capacity of the interpreter 
to be re-united with the author on account of some shared 
subjectivity. And certainly Gadamer is well justified in 
rejecting such a representation of connaturality. Implicit 
1 , 
Gadamer, Truth and Method. 
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in his description·of the "miracle of understanding" is a 
redefinition of the process by which understanding between 
the very different occurs. This redescription suggests that 
it is possible for understanding to tak~ place even amidst 
extreme differences between the narrator and the historical 
object under study. Narrative understanding is accomplished 
when a common language is established between persons (agents) 
sharing the common structures of existence; namely inten-
tionality, teleology and temporality. By common language we 
·mean something far more primary than "English" or "Portuguese" 
(though, Olafson notes that many times, when natural lan-
guages fail to be shared between the historian and the his-
torical object, translation is possible through the estab-
lishment of equivalences). 1 The deeper point is this, "When 
a historian addresses himself to the past ... the guiding 
assumption is that here too a common language--a shared 
vocabulary of action descriptions exists, or that it can be 
brought into being through a process of semantic adjustments 
within the language the historian uses himself. 112 
The Narrative Structure of Chronicles 
It should not be surprising',. considering the develop-
ment of narrative understanding, that neither Gadamer, nor we 
ourselves, shall support the position that "there is something 
1olafson, Dialectic of Action, pp. 218-9. 
2 Ibid., pp. 218-9. 
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one might call a pure description in contrast with something 
else called an interpretation. 111 Collingwood characterizes 
this position as historical study under the direct influence 
of philosophical positivism. The positivist historians 
maintain, says Collingwood, that interpretations require laws 
and philosophical assumptions, whereas all that is necessary 
in order to understand history is the collection of facts 
which have taken place in time. 2 According to Collingwood, 
the positivistic historian adopts two rules of methodology 
for doing history. 
1. Each fact is to be regarded as a thing capable 
of·being ascertained by a separate act of cogni-
tion or process of research. 
2. Each fact is to be thought of not only as inde-
pendent of all the rest but as independent of 
the -knower, so that all subjective elements (as _ 
they were called) in the historian's point of 
view had to be eliminated. The historian must 
pass no judgement on the facts: he must only 
3 -say what they are. 
The adoption of the first rule, early in the century when it 
was initially employed, had the effect of dicing up the entire 
- 1A. Danto, Anal~tical Philosophy of History (London: 
Cambridge U. Press, 196 ), p. 115~ 
2 . 
Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 131. 
3 rbid., . p. 131. 
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field of the historically knowable into an infinite number 
of singular facts each to be separaetly analyzed. By impli-
cation, no historical research was considered important or 
serious if it did not deal with either some one particular 
microscopic issue or at most a set of microscopic issues. 1 
Mommsen was perhaps the greatest of the positivist historians 
and the one who in his work best exemplifies the effects of 
the first hypothesis. Adoption of the second rule above im~ 
plies the restriction of historical study to the realm of 
external events. This is of course merely a restatement of 
the principle of extensionality which we discussed in chapter 
one. The principle of extensionality requires that the vali-
dity of an explanation and the truth claims of its premises 
· cannot be contingent upon either the manner in which the 
event is described or desc~iptions that incorporate a reference 
to the end state the occurrence of which is to be explained. 
The weakness of the second rule was pointed out when it was 
examined in light of intensionality. 
The great shortcoming of the positivistic historians 
is that they never really asked · the fundamental epistemo-
1.ogical question "how is historical knowledge possible?" 
The conception of dealing with the facts and nothing but the 
fatts may (perhaps) be legitimate in the natural sciences 
wherein prediction and the reproduction of evidence via 
experimentation . is possible. Let us leave to one side the 
1collingwood, The Idea of HistoFy, p. 131. 
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positivist view of natural science. However, prediction and 
the reproduction of evidence is foreign to historical study. 
In the end, the positivistic historians, though praiseworthy 
for the exacting and informative research which helped his-
torical studies get back to the events themselves as opposed 
to grand historicist schemes, have relied on a false analogy 
between "facts" of the natural sciences and the "facts" of 
historical understanding. 
A view which developed as an offshoot of historical 
positivism, when it became apparent that doing history was 
more than "pure description" of events in time was presente·d 
in the historical writings and philosophy of W. H. Walsh. 1 
This particular position, distinguished between the role and 
·function of the chronicle and the historical narrative. It 
maintains that is is the job of the chronicler to 'just give 
descriptions of events,' and it is left up to the historian 
(though in fact the historian may perform both the function 
of the chronicler and the narrator) to interpret the descrip-
tions of past events and p~oduce from them some semblance of 
a narrative account. But again~ concerning this view's 
representation of the function of the chronicler, we must 
ask the same question; namely, whatever can it mean just to 
give an account of what happened and nothing more than that? 
In his text Introduttion to Philosophy of History,· 
1w. H. Walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History 
(London: H~tchinsons U. Library, 1951). 
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Walsh presents the position which we have just articulated. 1 
According to him, history qua chronicle merely records events 
which have occurred, while history qua narrative interprets 
them. The project of the former is pure description, of the 
latter responsible interpretation which is faithful to the 
facts. Walsh states concerning these two possibilities for 
historical study, the following: 
The first is that the historian confines himself (or 
should confine himself) to an exact description of what 
happened, constructing what might be called a plain 
narrative of ~ast events. The other is that he goes 
beyond such a plain narrative, and aims not merely at 
saying what happened, but also· (in som~ sense) ex-
plaining it. 2 
Take note that we have substituted the word 'chronicle' for 
Walsh's term and 'historical narrative' for the action which 
Walsh refers to as 'explaining' the events under scrutiny. 
· Also take note that both the positivistic historians and 
Walsh imply that narrative understanding, _as we have developed 
it thus far in this chapter, is not the most fundamental sort 
of coherent knowledge possible for the interpreter concern~d 
with the meaning of human actions. Is it possible, however, 
for them (Walsh and the positivistic historians) to speak 
on one level about mere events and on another about the 
interpretation of events as if these two processes were 
totally distinct? Is there such a thing as an ihterpretation-
31. 
1 Walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History, Pw 
2 Ibid., p. 31. 
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free fact? In order to answer these questions we shall need. 
to return to an examination of Walsh's position as represehted 
above, and, more specifically, discuss the notions of chron-
icle and narrative in order to find out how exactly they are 
similar and different. 
In order to discuss more critically Walsh's comments 
above, we need to set forth two apparently necessary condi-
tions of any narrative or chronicle. First, the piece must 
report events which have already happened. Second, this same 
piece must present them in their proper chronological order, 
or, at least, enable us to tell in what order the events 
actually occurred. 1 These two components may provide the 
necessary conditions for both a chronicle and a narrative, 
but they fail to provide the sufficient conditions for a 
chronicle to be accepted (or a narrative for that matter) as 
a piece of informative history. For example, the following 
chronicle; though informative _in some small way, is so mini-
mally inform~tive that it is useless to the historian whose 
work it is to produce a narrative account. 
1. "In 1501 Sir Thomas· Moore became a barrister. 112 
2. "Morgan City was founded in 1850. 113 
3. In 1934, Henry Morgenthau Jr. became Secretary 
of the U.S. Treasury. 4 
1nanto, Analytical Philosophy of History, p. 117. · 
2Encyclopedia Britanica, 15th 
3 Ibid., s.v. "Morgan City." 
d "Th M II e ., s.v. omas oore. 
s.v. "Henry Morgenthau Jr." 
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Though clearly a chronology, it is obvious that beside the 
first two components we have delineated, a third must be 
included if it is to be employed by the historian; that the 
chronicle must necessarily explain what happened. 
But that a chronicle which fulfills all three of 
these conditions can still fall short of what is necessary 
for a chronicle to be useful to the historian--i.e., an 
informative chronicle--is easily demonstrated. 
1. In 1571 Sultan Selim II contributed to the Otto-
man decisiort to attack Cyprus because of his 
hatred for Venice. 1 
2 . . Alwin Nikolais studied dance with Truda Kaschman 
around 1935. 2 
3. In 1983 M. Patrice Farley baked bread at her 
home in Nc;1rragansett, . Rhode Is land. 
Th6ugh in a sense, implicit in the development of the notion 
of narrative understanding we could say that ultimately all 
three event-explanation accounts above could be linked to-
gether in one great ideal narrative, the three criteria which 
we have established cannot be said to constitute sufficient 
conditions for an informative chronicle which would be useftil 
in the actual pr~ctice or writirig historical narrative~ 
Experiencing his own diffi~ulties in distinguishing 
plain narrative (informative chroniclei) from chronicles 
which explain events (historical narrative), Walsh in the 
same Introduction to Philosophy of History is compelled to 
1 
Encyclopedia Britanica, s.v. "Sultan Selim II." 
2•Ibid., s.v. "Alwin Nikolais." 
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call upon Ranke, the famous positivist historian, for assis-
tance. Responding to this compulsion, Walsh, as we shall 
see, only serves to weaken his ·case. Walsh states "that 
chronicles have as their purpose to report in the famous 
phrase of Ranke's 'precisely what happened' and leave the 
1 matter at that." In order to make a point, though at the 
expense of both Walsh and Ranke, let's take the phrase above 
literally and squeeze it for all its worth or lack thereof. 
Literally, Walsh and Ranke could be interpreted as 
maintaining that the properly functioning chron~cle is . one 
which not only provides an account of a "happening," but one 
which mentions everything that took place at that particular 
happening. Not only does such a conception of chronicle 
fail for its lack of any limiting schema whereby one "happen-
ing'' is distinguished from every other, but also for its 
failure to qualify exactly what type of information is infor-
mative for providing an account of a "happening." With 
regards to the latter criticism, the failure to 'set limits,' 
ai it were, on the sort of information that contributes to 
the description of a "happening" . results in what we might 
call a "criteria-less chronicle." Dante, below, provides a 
delightful example of Walsh's and Ranke's "criteria-less" 
chronicle. 
1walsh, Introduction to Philosophy of History, p. 
32. 
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Suppose I wish to know what happened at a court trial. 
I may ask my informant to leave nothing out, to tell me 
all. But I should be dismayed if, in addition to tell-
ing me of the speeches of the attorneys, the emotional 
attitude of the litigants, the behavior of the judge, he 
were to tell me how many flies were in the courtroom, 
and show me a complicated map of the precise orbits in 
which they flew. A vast tangle of epicycles. Or mention 
all the coughs and sneezes. TRe story would be sub-
merged in all these details. I can imagine him saying: 
'At this point a fly lighted upon the rail of the writers 
box.' For I would expect something odd to follow: 
the witness screams displaying a weird phobia. Or a 
brilliant attorney takes this as an occasion for a 
splendid forensic display CAs this fly, ladies and 
gentlemen •.. "). Or in trying to brush him away a 
bottle of ink gets spilled over a critical piece of evi-
dence. Whatever the case, I shall want to know: what 
about the fly? 
If, however, as was the case.with Danto's informer, there is 
no 11what about" as concerns the fly, that, in fact, it was 
mentioned only because it was one of the many things which 
occurred over Lhe span of the trial, then the above unin-
formative chronicle is of no value in understanding what 
took place at the trial. 2 
Based upon the arguments presented, a distinction 
shall be made which Walsh, in both his original quote and in 
the second quote above, failed to make: namely, a distinc-
tion bet~een the chronicle and ihe informative chronicle. 
As it turns out, the type of historical literature which is 
produced in the attempt to take literally the injuction by 
both Walsh and the positivist historians (merely record 
events!"), is uninformative to the historian and criteria--
1 Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, p. 131. 
2 rbid., p. 131. 
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less. Informative chronicles, however, are a different 
story. The objective of the informative chronicle is to 
supply a report of events, relevant for the particular 
"happening" under study, with a mininum of interpretation 
taking place. With that said concerning the objective of the 
informative chronicle, we shall make no attempt to minimize 
the presence, within the inform~tive chronicle itself, of 
the structures reflecting intentionality, teleology and 
temporality. Structures which in subtle ways order the 
potential randomness. 
Without compulsion to specify exactly how informa-
tive chronicles and narratives differ, we can nonetheless 
affirm that the suspicion with which hermeneutic philosophers 
have dealt with various p6sitivist conceptions of chronicles 
has been well founded. As a minimal characterization we 
shall say that the informative chronicle is structured in 
such a way that it is enabled to present coherent data for 
the emplotment of the narrative historian. Those organiza-
tional structures or employments often place special empha-
sis on one particular event or series of events and describe 
the remaintng events of the sequence (those chronologically 
antecedent as well as those which follow aft~rwards) in 
direct reference to its occurrence. 
An excellent example of the informative chronicle 
is found in the writings of Eusebius of Caesarea. In the 
third and early fourth centuries (A.D.), he set forth in his 
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Chronicles, a chronicle wherein all significant events at 
the time were structured within a single chronological frame-
. k 1 wor . The framework of the chronicle had as its basis the 
birth of Christ, as opposed to the other chronicles of his 
period which were dated in accordance with Olympiads or the 
other events in Rome. Later in his life, Eusebius composed 
another work called Praeparatio Evangelica in which he pro-
duced a very simple narrative (almost like what we have 
referred to as an informative chronicle) of a world history 
that has as its structuring theme the Incarnation of Jesus 
Christ. 2 All historical events recorded here are shaped in 
relation to the theme of the Incarnation. 
Of course, an even more subtle informative chronicle 
with which we are all familiar and which clearly bears the 
mark of an or_ganizational structure, is our current calendar. 
The birth of Christ is the horizonal point from which all of 
history past, present and future is, in the very act of dat-
ing, interpreted. 
Hayden White, in his analysis of the historical 
narrative provides a model which we can adapt to illustrate 
the point we are making about informative chronicles. He 
suggests in this .model that too often what ha.s been charac-
terized _ as objective, non-manipulated chronologies that 
simply record what actually happened, 11are themselves 
1Eusebius Pamphili, The Ecclesiastical History 
(Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1973-5). 
2 Ibid. 
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linguistically ordered in such a way that subtle relations 
between events are established which only later are made 
explicit by the histo~ian. 111 White's first illustration 
provides an example which typifies the positivist under-
standing of chronicles. 
Thus we have the set of events, 
1 • a , b , c , d , e , . . . , N2 
However, as we have said, this is seldom an adequate example 
of the emplotments which take place in informative chronicles. 
Sentences (2-6) illustrate more accurately the structural 
content of the chronicle. 
2) A, b, .c, d, e, ... , N 
3) a, B, c, d, e, 
4) a, b, C, d, e, 
5) a, b, c, D, e, 
6) a, b; c, d, E, 
• ' N 
• , N 
• ' N 
N3 . ' 
Those letters which are capitalized indicate an event (or 
set of events), within the chronicle, which are given the 
status by which they are empowered with explanatory force. 
White continues in his explanation of bow such informative 
chronicles would "work themselves out" if a historian were 
to base his narrative upon these particular skeletal accounts. 
Hopkins 
1H. White, Tro)ics of Discourse 
U. Press , 19 7 8 , p . 9 2 • 
2 Ibid., p. 92. 
3 rbid., p. 92. 
(Baltimore: John 
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We might say that any history (historical narrative) 
which endows any putatively original event (a) with 
the status of a decisive factor (A) in the structura-
tion of th~ whole series of events following after it 
is "deterministic." The emplotments of the history 
of "society" by Rousseau in his Second Discourse, 
Marx in the Manifesto, and Freud in the Totem and 
Taboo would fall in this category. So too, any 
history which endows the last event in the series 
(e), whether real or only speculatively projected, 
with the force of full explanatory power (E) is 
the type of all eschatological or apocalytpical 
histories. St. Augustine's City of God and the 
various versions of the Joachite notion of the ad-
vent of a millenium, Hegel's Philosophy of History, 
and, in general, all Idealist (in the Utopian 
sense) histories are of this sort. In between we 
would have the various forms ... [all of which] 
... endow the series 1with a perceivable form and conceivable "meaning ·." 
In the case, therefore, . of both the (our) Christian calendric 
form and the various literary structures which chronicles 
employ to . order events, are evident the components of 
·narrative understanding that we have been discussing; i.e., 
intentionality, teleology and temporality. Obvious in in-
formative chronicle, as in narrativet are the intentional 
relations between events listed in the chronological sequence 
as well as the intentional relations between the chronicle 
itself and its author. In the same way the temporal 
references both backward ~nd forward in time between the 
agent(s) actions and the objects(s) (as the case may be), 
and, also, the historicity-laden character of the chroni-
cler is evident. Finally in both the chronicle record and 
the act of chronicling itself a teleological structure is 
1White, Tropics of Discourse, p. 93 .. 
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present. 
Whether one would wish to commit himself to White's 
reduction of all p9ssible linguistic structures for the com-
position of chronicles (and narratives for that matter) to 
those of a distinctively "fictional" sort (Romance, Comedy, 
Tragedy, Satire), or, whether one would be compelled to admit 
that chronicles are necessarily composed by means of any 
specific linguistic techniques, is1not the real issue at 
this juncture in our discussion. Rather, the central point 
is • that, contrary to the positivist misconstrual of chronicle, 
as the objective presentation of the actual event evident 
in the structure and composition of any informative chronicle 
the same three features that are fundamental to narrative, 
namely intentionality, teleology, and temporality. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Gadamer fails 
to single out chronicle as a form of historical understanding 
that objectively describes "real 11 events. This is not to 
say no distinctions exist which differentiate understanding 
reflected in the writing of chronicles and narratives. 
However, such distinctions, esp~cially between the informative -
chronicle and the narrative, are far mo.re minimal than may 
have been previously assumed. More important that distin-
guishing, or should we say failing to distinguish, in any 
significant way between the type of understanding involved-
' 
in writing an informative chronicle and a narrative is the 
consequent position we have arrived at concerning the 
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possibility of a non-narrative understanding of human events. 
Implicit in our conclusion concerning the e.xtension of narra-
tive understanding to the arena of chronicle composition is 
the assumption that there is no such state or place called 
"objective distance" in narrative understanding. This point 
harkens all the way back to Abel's criticism . of Verstehen 
that its failure to be useful in historical study was due to 
its failure to provide some sort of critical distance between 
the historian and historical object. "Critical distance" 
or "distanciation" implies the notion •Of the ontological 
capacity of the historian or social scientist to stand apart 
from the object and thus speak objectively concerning its 
meaning. Because of the seriousness of this assumption let 
us now discuss in more detail some of the epistemic and 
ontological issues involved in such a claim. We shall be 
forced to limit our discussion, unfortunately, to the most 
recent debate between J. Habermas and H. G. Gadamer concerning 
,the subject of distanciation. 
Distanciation 
The issue of "critical instance" or "distanciation" 
h~s become a major concern in recent years for philosophers 
in the social sciences. In the project of interpreting social 
meanings can we speak of a conceptual apparatus which enables 
the interpreter to stand apart from the subject being inter-
preted? Is there such a place or state called "objective 
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distance" in narrative understanding? Is there in fact a 
need for "objective distance" in understanding social meanings? 
Or, are interpreters, in fact all persons, bound to a finite 
understanding which includes the assumption of a particular 
tradition or pre-understanding for one's evaluation of the 
world? Such questions as these set the stage for the classic 
clash between H. G. Gadamer and J. Habermas. In order to 
come to grips e-istemologically with the implications of our 
articulation of narrativ~ understanding, we shall attempt to 
review the hermeneutical theory of Gadamer in contrast with 
that of Habermas. In the discussion which is to follow the 
limiting theme shall be the problem of distanciation. 
The point of conflict between J. Habermas and H. G. 
Gadamer has often been characterized as the conflict between 
enlightenment, emancipatory reflection and romantic histori-
cism. Gadamer is not particularly fond of this characteriza-
tion. The main reason for his dissatisfaction lies in what 
he conceives to be a false antithesis between reason and 
authority. "Refle_ction," maintains Gadamer, "is not always 
and unavoidably a step towards dissolving prior convictions. 111-
Such a positiqn grants reflection a power far beyond its 
capacities. In his text Truth and Method, Gadamer makes the 
following claim: 
It is true that it is primarily persons that have autho-
rity; but the authority of persons is based ulti~ately, 
1H. G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: 
Univ·. of Cal. Press, 1977), p. 33. 
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not on the subjection and abdication of reason, but on 
acceptance and recognition--recognition, namely, that 
the other is superior to oneself in judgment and in-
sight and that for this reason his judgment takes pre-
cedence, i.e., it has priority over one's own .... 
[authority] rests on considerance and hence on an act 
of . reason itself which is aware of its own limitation, 
accepts that others have better understanding. Authority 
in this •sense, properly understood, has nothing to do 
with blind obedience to a command. Indeedr authority 
has nothing to do with obedience; it rests on recog-
nition.1 
The "power of authority" has nothing to do, according to 
Gadamer, with force or blind faith but rather with its capa-
city to provide 'more mature, reasonable and informed judg-
ments. In acknowledging tradition as the fundamental source 
of values he_is not in any way opposing tradition or authority 
to reason. As he states "preservation is as much a freely 
chosen action as revolution and renewal. 112 A tradition is 
rather a battery of values, commitments, beliefs and the 
entirety of influen~es upon one's self and one's tulture~ 
which must be tested, doubted, and compared with values from 
other traditions and then modified when necessary. A tradi-
tion, like a collective pre-understanding, is something 
which must be consciously and unconsciously grasped and main-
tained. Though in ideal terms there is one great narrative 
w.hich is discovered at the conclus.ion of the infinite 
question-answer dialogue, in actuality we find ourselves in 
1 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 248. 
2 rbid., p. 25. · 
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a world filled with traditions different from our own. 
Gadamer posits hermeneutics as the subordination of 
epistemology to ontology. Against Hambermas' critical 
distartciation he ''does not simply plead the advantages of 
tradition; he argues that participation in a cultural heri-
tage is a condition of possibility of all thought, including 
critical reflection. 111 He argues further that in order to 
call into question a tradition, one in which the questioner 
himself dwells, one presupposes and furthers its life. 
Reflection is every bit as contextually dependent as any 
other human action or mode of thought. Gadamer's claim of 
hermeneutics to universality is grounded in the view that: 
Understanding and coming to an understanding do not 
refer primarily or originally to a methodically 
trained behavior towards texts; rather they are in the 
form in which the social life of men is carried out, a 
social life which--rendered fo~mally--is community in 
dialogue. Nothing is excepted from this community, 
no. experience of the world whatsoever. 2 
As T. McCarthy so lucidly states: "Gadamer's universaliza-
tion of hermeneutics rests on a logical argument against the 
possibility of methodologically transcending the hermeneutic 
point of view. Any attempt to do so is inconsistent with 
the very conditions of the possibility of understanding. 113 
Against emancipatory methodologies Gadamer maintains 
1 ' 
T. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas 
(Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 187. 
p~ 193. 
2 Gadamer 
3 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, 
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the inescapability of historical efficacy. Because human 
being is situated in historical process it is impossible 
for us to distance ourselves from one place in the process 
so as to examine the past objectively; Ricoeur suggests 
that 11 ••• [Gadamer's] concept of effective histbry belongs 
to an ontology of finitude. It plays the same role as th~ 
'thrown object' and the 'situation' play in Heidegger's on-
tology.111 Such an ontology of finitude means both that 
there is no position of overview which provides an objective 
or complete picture, and, on the other hand, there is also 
no such thing as a situation with no view at all. Any time 
there is a situation there are horizons present which are 
. 2 
able to expand or contract. 
The hermeneutic experience, says Gadamer, is neither 
an objective nomological science nor is it the dialectical 
absolute knowledge of a universal history. Rather, as based 
upon the model of human conversation it ·could be referred 
to as dialogical. Not unlike conversation, hermeneutical 
dialogue involves an equal and reciprocal relationship 
between interpreter and text Cot object). As conversations 
are, always about something, the dialogue likewise assumes 
that a common question joins the two together. As D. E. Linge 
states: 
1P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1981), p. 74. 
2 rbid., p. 74. 
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.•. The hermeneutical conversation begins when th,e 
interpreter genuinely opens himself to the text by 
listening to it and allowing it to assert its view-
point. It is precisely in contra~ting the otherness 
of the text--in having its challenging viewpoint--and 
not in preliminary methodological self-purgations, that 
the reader's own prejudice (i.e.~ his present horizons) 
~e thrown into relief and thus come to critical self 
consciousness . 
. . . collisions with the othet's horizons make us-
aware of assumptions so deep rooted that they would 
otherwise remain unnoticed. This awareness of our own 
historicity and finitude~-our consciousness of effective 
history--brings with it an openness to new possibilities 
that is the precondition of genuine understanding.1 
A dialogue is the argreement between two parties who are 
from unique horizons (i.e., they accept unique authorities) • 
to place themselves in the other's point of view and confront 
themselves with their present horizon and prejudices. It is 
only in the tension between an other and myself that pre-
judice becomes operative and vulnerable for evaluation. 
The universality of hermeneutics and dialogical 
evaluation--as opposed to critical distanciation--go together. 
Unlike Habermas interpreting subject who is capabl~ of 
distancing himself from his own ontological situation, 
Gadamer presents human being as a being who dwells iri the 
environment into which it has been thrown. The "thrownessl' 
of human being cannot be transcended completely by reflection 
or methodologies of any objective soit. Rather, bit by bit 
via ongoing conversation with persons thrown into other 
' 
horizontal vantages the person is . empowered rationally to 
1Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. XXII. 
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compare, test, and if found justifiable, reject elements of 
his own tradition in favor of the superiority of another. 
Habermas maintains that critical theory provides the indi-
vidual with ~n emancipatory methodology whereby he is able to 
transcend completely his horizon through reflection. Against 
such a position Gadamer maintains that "the reflecting sub-
ject takes for granted a host of concepts, judgments, prin-
ciples and standards that are not themselves made thematic; 
he cannot call everything into question all at once.'' He 
thus concludes ..• "Habermas ascribes to reflection a 
power that it could only have on ideal premis·es. 111 
Another device which Gadamer employs both to illu-
minate the character of interpretation and to criticiz~ the 
subject--object dichotomy in the process of human understand-
ing is the "game." In a game the participants, the players, 
are absorbed in the "back-and-forth" action. That there are 
rules and procedures of the game of which the player is 
aware does not preclud~ that the player is aware of himself 
as "merely playing." In fact, says Gadamer, the player that 
cannot, while fully aware of th~ rules, become fully involved 
--selflessly in vol ved--in the game is ref erred to as a _ "spoil 
sport." A "spoil sport" cannot play a game. If one had to 
choose the real subject of play it would be the game itself 
for". what is essential to the phenomenon of play is not 
so much the particular goal [a certain answer achieved] but 
1
McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, 
p. 187. 
69 
the dynamic back and forth movement [numerous finite inter-
pretations] in which the players are caught up--that the 
movement itself specifies how the goal will be reached. 111 
The hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur who has 
over the co~rse of the Habermas-Gadamer debate attempted to 
mediate between their positions, has written an essay on 
the subject of the similarities between interpreting a text 
and a human action. He states, on behalf of Gadamer's posi-
tion, that the action or text-as~game liberates, autonomizes 
the text from any one set absolute interpretation. Like the 
game, each textual interpretation lives· in its dialogue with 
the reader or interpreter. The infinite varieties of game 
experiences, or interpretations, is not to say that each is 
.a product of subjective projection, but instead reflects 
the inexhaustibility of a text's possibilities. We will 
return to Ricoeur's ideas in the next chapter and at that 
time clear up what Ricoeur means by the ",rntonomy" of the 
text. 
In the end--at least as far as this quick overview 
takes us--Gadamer identifies prejudice and horizontal finitude · 
as more characteristic of human being and understanding than 
Habermas' ontology, which supports a notion of human being 
as capable of objective (distanced) judgments. 
Language is the foundation of human understanding, ·it 
1Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. XXIII. 
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is the world in which human being dwells. The entire notion 
which Haber~as pres~nts, which we shall now turn to, that 
there is a social reality "that does not bring itself to 
representation in a consciousness that is linguistically 
articulated" is to Gadamer absurd. 1 As Gadamer puts it 
"reality does not happen behind the back" of language; it 
happens rather behind the back of those who live in the ·sub-
jective opinion that they have understood 'the world' (or 
can no longer understand it); that is, reality happens pre-
cisely within langauge. 112 
Habermas' central dictum against Gadamer is that 
the social sciences cannot be reduced to Verstehenden soci~ 
ology. In the tradition of Dilthey, Gadamer's hermeneutics 
reduces the social sciences to merely the discovery and ar-
ti~ulation of meaning. Hermeneutics does not relegate all 
meaning to ~ubjective, intentional meaning but as a result 
of making the language of tradition the "al 1- -encompass ing," 
Gad am er, s·ub 1 ima tes the interpretation of "transmitted 
meanings. 113 Habermas' own position maintains that "social 
action can only be comprehended . in an objective framework 
that is constituted conjointly by language, labour and ~ower 
p. 183 . 
1Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 35. 
2 rbid., p. 35. 
3 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, 
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[or dominationJ. 111 The meanings of tradition burst beyond 
the dimensions which Gadamer sets when culture is rightly 
viewed as a complex of social, economic and ~olitical con-
ditions. And if one does view culture in this light, 
Habermas suggests, traditional meanings, one discovers, can 
be vehicles for both revelation and expression as well as 
concealment and distortion. Habermas states it this way: 
The objectivity of a 'happening of tradition' that 
is made up of symbolic meaning is not objective enough. 
Hermeneutics comes up against walls of the traditional 
framework from the inside, as it were. As soon as these 
boundaries have been experienced and recognized, cultural 
traditions can no longer be posed as absolute. It makes 
good sense to conceive of language as a kind of meta- · 
institution on which all institutions are dependent; 
for social action is constituted only in ordinary lan-
guage communication. But this meta-institution (lan-
guage as tradition) is evidently dependent in turn on . 
social processes that are not exhausted in narrative rela-
tionships. Language is also a medium of domination and 
social power. It serves to legitimate relations of 
organized force. In so far as the legitimations do not 
articulate the relations of force that they make possible, 
in so far as these relations are me~ely expressed in the 
legitimations, language is also ideological. Here it 
is not a question of deceptio~s within language, but 
of deception with language as well. Hermeneutic ex-
perience that encounters this dependency of the sym-
bolic framework on actual conditions changes into the 
critique of ideology. 2 
The distortion . of language does · not come simply from language 
u~age as such, but from the relations of language, power and 
labour. These distortions are unrecognizable to the members 
of, or interpreters within a particular language community. 
1J. Habermas, Zur Logic der Sozialwissenschaften 
. (Frankfort: Subrkamp. Verlag, 1970), p. 287. 
2 rbid., p. 287. 
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Such distortions can be unveiled and analyzed phenomeno-
logically, holds Habermas, only through appealing to the 
conceptual apparatus of a psychoanalytic sort: "To illusion 
as distinct from error, to projection as the constitution 
of a false transcendence, to rationalization as the sub-
sequent rearrangement of motivations according to the appear-
ance of a rational justification." As opposed to the her-
meneutical form "misunderstanding," linguistic distortion 
in the critical social sciences is referred to as "systema-
tically distorted communication. 111 
Gadamer's dialogical model, Habermas mainta: be~ 
cause it so absolutizes the individual within his/her lin-
guistic tradition, is incapable of surmounting the "systema-
tically distorted communication" which the individual speaks 
and lives. The dissolution of ideology, therefore, can only 
be accomplished through the employment of procedures which 
focus not only on understanding but are also c?ncerned with 
criticism. Such procedures employ methodological apparatus 
which is underivable from a hermeneutics of ordinary lan-
guage. Rather, "such a theoretical apparatus must develop 
a system of reference that transcends tradition by systema-
tically accounting for the empirical conditions under which 
tradition develops and changes. 112 Paul Recoeur in the 
p. 183 • 
1Ricoeur, Hermeneutics a~d the Human Sciences, p. 84. 
2McCatthy, The Critical Theory of Jung er Habermas, 
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essay "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology" para-
phrases Habermas with the following, which nicely summarizes 
Habermas' critique of Gadamer and the relationship between 
. critical methodologies and hermeneutics: 
The understanding of meaning requires the detour of a 
reconstruction of the processes of desymbolization, 
which psychoanalysis retraces in the inverse direction 
along the routes of resymbolization. So psychoanalysis 
is not completely external to hermeneutics, since it 
can be expressed in terms of desymbolization and resym-
bolization; but rather it constitutes a limit--experience, 
in virtue of the explanatory force linked to the recon-
struction of the primitive scene. In other words, to 
understand the what of the symptom, it is necessary to 
explain its why. This explan?tory phase invokes a the-
oretical apparatus ·, which establishes the conditions o~ 
possibility of explanation and reconstruction: topo-
graphical concepts (the three agencies and the three 
roles), the economic concepts (the defense mechanism, 
primary and secondary regression, splitting off), genetic 
concepts (the famous stages and successive phases of 
symbol organization) ... The metaphychology con-
cludes Habermas, can be founded only as a meta-
hermeneutics. 1 
Gadamer's objection to this program, which is re-
peated over and over in his "debate" essays focuses on Ha-
bermas' contention that hermeneutics must be ~uperceded by 
the critique of ideology due to the existence of systemati-
cally distorted communication . . Gadamer avidly opposes · 
Habermas' insistence on establishing a false antithesis 
between understanding as the affirmation of horizontal 
prejudice and critical reflection as the emanciation from 
such traditional limitations. For Gadamer, ideology is 
accessible within the finitude of hermeneutical understanding. 
1 R' . 1.coeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. ·85. 
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Hermeneutics, without needing to employ the crutches of 
psychoanalysis and other social science apparatus, provides 
a quality of understanding which involves the rational cir-
ticism and rejection of unjustifiable bias or prejudices as 
well as the recognition of justified authority. 
It is Ricoeur's position that the differences between 
Habermas and Gadamer are not as great as supposed. He, like 
Gadamer, proposes that the "goals" of ideological critique, 
i.e., the . critical analysis of systematically distorted 
communication, can be accomplished via a well articulated 
hermeneutic. He also propounds, in critique of his fellow · 
hermeneutic philosopher, that Gadamer has been lax in ex-
panding or enlarging upon his notions of interpretation as 
"game" and "the text as a world in dialogue with the inter-
preter." In his essays "Hermeneutics and the Critique of 
Ideology" and "Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" 
Ricoeur atte ,mpts to construe t .a critical hermeneutic based 
upon the nature of the Literary Text. In chapter three we 
shall discuss in detail Ricoeur's heimeneutic developments 
not only as concerns the problem of distanciation, but also 
his application of narrative understanding to the biblical 
text. 
Before concluding, it may be helpful to summarize the 
arguments presented in behalf of hermeneutics against cri-
tical theory. 1) Habermas fails to recognize sufficiently 
the finitude of reflection. As temporally bound, reflection 
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is never able fully to purge itself of prejudgements at-
tained through tradition. 2) Garamer maintains that Haber-
mas is incorrect when he speaks of the "real" conditions 
which shape language as the conditions "behind language." 
Language, he maintains, is not a dimension of society but 
the "universal medium" of social existence. Labour, power, 
and technology are not behind but rather mediated through 
language. 3) The assumption that the existence of systema-
tically distorted communication is inaccessible to hermeneu-
tical understanding is an incorrect and ~nnecessary assump-
tion. Hermeneutic philosophy is able to bridge the chasm of 
miscommunication via semantic adjustments as mentioned 
earlier in our discussion of connaturality. 4) Even the 
very notion of the critique of ideology is based in a clear 
tradition and is not emancipatory at all .. It is based in 
the tradition of the Enlightenment. 5) Finally, Habermas 
establishes a false antinomy between.reminiscenc~ (tradi-
tion) and hope (emancipation). Eschatology, however, is 
vacuous without the tradition of the past with its studies 
of the great acts of deliveranc~. 1 
Let us, at this time, recall prior to beginning 
chapter three, the progression which our discussion has thus 
far made. In the first chapter we attempted to work out the 
design of an ontology that was responsive to the structures 
1 R · . H · d h H S . 100 icoeur, ermeneutics an t e uman ciences, p. . 
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of human action. These structures consisted of intentionality, 
teleology and temporality. Based upon those ontological 
structures of human actions, in chapter two a notion of 
narrative understanding was developed. As has been said 
before, narrative understanding is the development of a 
hermeneutic of human action which corresponds to the onto-
logical makeup of human being and action. In that it is 
principally the historian's task to interpret the meanings 
of human actions in past history, we did have occasion to 
note the extreme similarity between the interpretation of, 
say, "neighbor (N) who cut and ignited logs on that parti-
cular inclement day," and the action by Erasmus of writing a 
letter. Even though in the former case we were dealing with 
the interpretation of a (supposed) actual event and in the 
other strictly with historical texts, in both cases the same 
ontological structures were evident. Further, because those 
same structures were evident, it appears to be the case that 
the process of.understanding both actions and texts take the 
form of narrative description or interpretation. 
In the chapter which is.to follow, we shall examine 
the plausibility of the following two hypotheses. First, 
because understanding human action takes the form of a 
narrative description (which is in fact a specific literary 
gerire), it follows that the process of understanding a human 
action is modelled or best typified by the process.of in-
terpreting a narrative text. Second, since at its most 
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basic level, the Scriptures of the Judaeo-Christian tradi-
tion compose a narrative of the Divine-human relationship, 
it will be profitable and appropriate to examine various 
hermeneutical assumptions which influence biblical inter-
pretation techniques in the effort to ensure that the onto-
logical structures of both the interpreter and the biblical 
text are neither betrayed nor ignored. 
In surveying the recent phil6sophical literature 
written by hermeneutic philosophers, it is disappointing to 
note the lack of attention which they have given to the last 
two hypotheses proposed above. This is especially true in · 
the case of the application of hermeneutics to the biblical 
text. As a result of this lack, we shall be forced to focus 
almost completely on the recent writings of Paul Ricoeur. 
Beginning with his attempt to strike a resolution in the 
debate concerning distanciation, we shall chart his philo-
sophical program to its culmination in biblical criticism. 
CHAPTER III 
IMPLICATIONS OF NARRATIVE UNDERSTANDING 
FOR THE BIBLICAL TEXT 
Ricoeur's article "The Model of Text: Meaningful 
Action Considered as a Text," first published in 1971, was 
an explicit attempt to discuss the ontological similarities 
· between human actions and literary texts and to draw out 
the implications similarities may have upon the interpretive 
approach employed for both action and text. 1 Ricoeur's 
effort shall be of acute inter~st to us in this chapter for 
it is at this issue that we will begin charting the direction 
which Ricoeur's particular hermeneutic philosophy is moving 
in its attempt to interpret the Christian Scriptures. In 
this chapter we shall attempt the three-fold task: 1) expli-
cation of Ricoeur's essay as it concerns the similarities 
between texts and actions and also a brief introductory word 
about the fruits which such a comparison may have for biblical 
interpretation, 2) discussion of Ricoeur's notion of biblical 
discourse as it relates to the idea of revelation, apd 3) 
articulation of Ricoeur's program for the re-unification of 
197-222. 
1 R" 1coeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, pp. 
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modern-secularist man with the Christian Word. 
Interpreting Actions and Texts 
Allusion was made late in the last chapter to Ricoeur's 
attempt to bridge the gap between Habermas' and Gad am er '·s 
contrary positions regarding distanciation. A brief articu-
lation of exactly how Ricoeur attempts to build such a bridge 
will prove helpful for a better understanding of his notion 
of the relationship between text and action. 
In the last, chapter it was merely stated that 
"Ricoeur attempts to construct a literary hermeneutic based 
upon the nature of the literary text." What that precisely 
means is that within the."being" of a text itself are quali-
ties which are distanciatory in character:-. In other words, 
the literary text is not confined to the limiting factors 
under which it was created. According to Ricoeur, the text 
is characterized by "a three-fold autonomy; with regards to 
the intention of the author; with respect to the cultural 
situation and all of the sociological conditions of the pro-
duction of the text; and finally with respect to the original 
addressee. 111 Upon completion, the text is immediately freed 
from the horizonal intentions of the author, of the tradition 
within and perhaps for which it was written, and, upon being 
read, the text is on each occasion recontextualized. From 
this position Ricoeur distinguishes his own concept of the 
1 R" 1.coeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 91. 
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emancipatory text from the Gadamerian notion of the dialogue. 
Reading a written document is different from being part 
of a living dialogue. Even in dialogue we can never, 
except by inference, penetrate the interiority of other 
persons. But there is at least a common situation, a 
common cultural context. 
When a discourse assumed written form, however, it be-
gins a new career. The meanings of written discourse 
are no longer bound, if they ever were, to the in ten- 1 tion of authors or the apprehensions of the first readers. 
In acknowledging the emancipatory or distanciating quality 
of the text, one is forced to recognize that at the very heart 
of the hetmeneutic circle is the critical moment; the capa-
city for criticism of one's own tradition as well as others 
is possible due to the mediation of the text. 
Ricoeur, in this same article, suggests that like the 
text, human actions have the three-fold autonomy. With re-
gards to the action's independence from its author, Ricoeur 
argues, as we did in the last chapter when we spoke of 
Erasmus' letter, that in retrospect, the meaning(s) of actions 
may be interpreted in a signif~cantly different fashion than 
when they were originally performed. In like fashion, oftimes 
the meaning of a text grows away from the original intentions 
of the author. It is not uncommon, in fact, for the author 
himself (of either a text or action) to reinterpret the 
meaning(s) in retrospect. Concerning the autonomy of the 
action's meaning from the context' (socially) within which 
1P. Ricoeur, Essa son Biblical Inter 
L. S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, ' p. 
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it was performed, Ricoeur states the following: 
An important action, we could say, develops meanings 
which can be actualised or fulfilled in situations 
other than the one in which this action occurred. To 
say the same thing in different words, the meaning of 
an important event, exceeds, overcomes, transcends, the 
~ocial con~itions of its 1production and may be re-enacted in new social contexts. · 
Imp or tan t actions, 1 ike texts, have a durable qu·a1 i ty. 
Their meanings are not only capable of transcending social 
barriers, but, in a sense, temporal ones as well. Finally, 
Ricoeur suggests that both texts and actions are "open 
works. 112 Much like the way Collingwood speaks of the infinite 
question-answer dialogue, the meanings of actions and texts· 
are ever open to new questions and complex relationships as 
they are viewed in retrospect. 
Now that we have sketched out the general direction 
whtch Ricoeur has taken in the debate about distanciation 
and have elaborated the implications of his view for the 
interpretation of texts and action~, we shall now be interested 
to discover how exactly Ricoeur applies this for the develop-
ment of a biblical hermeneutic. A biblical hermeneutic is 
necessary becaus~ the life and ~ctions of Jesus (Hebrews, 
Paul Apostles) are understood through the mediation of 
Scripture texts. Our narrative understanding of Jesus et 
al. occurs through the mediation or interpretation of 
1Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 
208. 
2 rbicL, p. 208. 
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Scriptures. Ricoeur, in his essay "Preface to Bultmann," 
~n The Conflict of Interpretations, 1 lays ou ·t the develop-
ment of the mediations for the interpretation of Scriptures 
something like this: 
Jesus fiif e of Christ 
& ~nte~pretation 
O.T. #1 <:; Acts Gospels . & terpretation Epistles . #2 Interpretation 
. . . #3 
And the last level (#4) of interpretation is of course the 
history of th~ Christian tradition up to and including today. 
Each level of interpretation was and is the attempt to inte~-
pret the past actions of God and persons involved with him 
in light of the events and concerns at that particular time~ 
We shall hesitate until the second section of this 
chapter to deal specifically with Ricoeur's work on biblical 
discourse. At this time we shall trace out the broad lines 
of his overall approach to the literary text and make some 
comments about the text of Scripture itself. 
Ricoeur rejects the assumption made by both Schleier-
macher and the early Dilthey, that in order to understand 
the meaning(s) of a text one must understand the intentions 
of the author. Ricoeur likewise rejects the position which 
suggests that the goal of a hermeneutic is to grasp the 
text's meaning(s) in the same fashion as the original hearers 
1P. Ricoeur, The . Conflict of Interpretations (Evans-
ton: Northwestern U. Press, 1974), pp. 381-401. 
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or readers. In distinguishing Ricoeur's hermeneutic ftom 
that of both Schleiermacher' s an·o the early Dilthey' s 
approach, L. S. Mudge states that "Whereas in Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey 'interpretation' means Verstehen understood as a 
kind of empathy with the writer, Ricoeur is in search of a 
theory of interpretation in which 'understanding' seeks to 
help in objective 'explanation' and returns deepened and 
enlarged. 111 Whatever does Mudge i"mply by the term "objective 
explanation?" Though perhaps stated too militantly, Mudge's 
opinion is that (in Ricoeur's view) the object of interpreta-
tion, for the interpreter, is not the author's inward in-
tended meaning for the text, nor the receptive expectation 
of the addressee, nor even the reflection which the text 
provides of the tradition within which it was produced. 
Rather, the object of interpretation is the text itself. 
Initially, of course, at the original occurrence of 
the act being recorded in a text, there is a relationship 
which exists between the event and the meaning. 2 Following 
the completion of the act, the act is surpassed by the mean-
ing. The interpteter is therefore able to interpret without 
psychologizing (presupposing the author's intended meaning 
behind the words of the text), because, Ricoeur maintains 
"the utterance meaning points back toward the utterer's · 
1 R" . E 1.coeur, ssays on Biblical Interpretation, p. 17; 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
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meaning thanks to the self-reference of discourse to itself 
as event. 111 Ricoeur's point is all of this is actually 
less complex than it may appear: the object of interpretation 
is the text and the , text alone, disassociated, as it were, 
from all original ties. The originary conditions of pro-
duction are important only insofar as the text itself expli-
citly or implicitly makes reference to them. The text is 
the autonomous object and it is fully able, if studied cri-
tically, to inform the interpreter how it is to be inter-
preted. The questioning process of the interpreter proceeds 
not on the basis of "why the author wrote 'this' or 'that'", 
or even "how do you suppose those who received the text 
understood it?" Rather, the question which must be asked 
is "how does the text witness in its various literary 
genres?" This particular question will be for us the seminal 
question of the second part of our discussion in this chapter. 
Interpreting the Biblical Text 
Basic to Ricoeur's work on biblical hermeneutics is 
his attempt to construct a position which would avoid: 
1) interpretations which are culture bound, and 2) those 
which overly objectivize the Scriptures in the effort to 
eradicate the role of interpretation altogether. True to 
his commitment to narrative understanding, as we have developed 
it in this thesis, he is concerned that the effective 
1P. Ricoeur, Inter retation Theor : Discourse and 
the Surplus of Meaning Fort Worth: , p. 
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presence of both hermeneutic circles--the originary context 
to which the text itself refers as well as the interpreter's 
own context--are acknowledged and appropriately dealt with in 
the hermeneutic process. Ricoeur ,maintains· that if one 
recognizes the d·ouble-sidedness of the text as both autono-
mous from its original setting (except when the text itself 
acknowledges indebtedness for its expressive character) and 
as a being which contains its own inherent structure (dis-
course genres), one discovers that it it through the text, 
more than any other transcending medium, that we are able 
to be liberated from the "confines" of our finite traditions 
and seek a fuller explanation of the meaning(s) of our 
existence. The text frees itself from its origins due to 
the supercession of meaning over event and it escapes the 
manipulative hand of the interpreter by evidencing a semantic 
encodation of its own, which, when left unrecognized in a 
poor interpretation, testifies to the lack of responsiveness 
by that interpretation to the text. 
In the case of the biblical text, the interpreter 
who ceases his attempt to psych6logize the text must still 
go one step further. He must allow the text itself to speak 
out and testify to its own meaningfulness through the various 
· discourse genres which constitute it. ·The move has to be 
made to allow the text to speak and not to superimpose upon 
its message either original influences, or a sort of mono-
lythic model of inspiration whereby all of Scripture is 
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interpreted as "propositions from the mouth of God himself." 
Avoiding both these pitfalls, Ricoeur suggests that the ob-
jective of biblical hermeneutics is to "stick close 'to 
those modalities of discourse that are most originary within 
the language of a community of faith,' without neutralizing 
the variety .in order to extract a theological content. 111 
In order, therefore, to rediscover the Word of God today, we 
must re-attend ourselves toward the manner in which the 
various discourse genres in the Bible reveal to us not only 
the person of God and his covenant with a people, but our 
own true identities. 
In a sense, Ricoeur's central dictum in biblical 
hermeneutics is close to Luther's in the 16th century: a 
plea to return to the biblical text and to be influenced by 
it above all other sources of knowledge. When one returns 
to the text itself and leaves the level of theological asser-
tion which incorporate concepts borrowed from speculative 
philosophy (eg. "God exists," "God is immutable," "God is 
omnipotent''), one finds the text to be rich with a variety 
of discourse forms. It is Ricoeur's thesis that in analyzing 
these discourse genres we can be confronted with the Word 
and can avoid, at least initially, imposing a systematic 
theology on the text. 
These originary expressions are caught up in forms 
of discourse as diverse as narration, prophecy, legis-
lative texts, wisdom sayings, hymns, supplications, and 
1 R" 1.coeur, Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p. 17. 
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thanksgiving. The mistaken assumption here would be to 
take forms of discourse as simply literary genres which 
ought to be neutralized so that we can extract their 
theological content .... To uproot this prejudice 
we must convince ourselves that the literary genres of 
the Bible do not constitute a rhetorical facade which 
it would be possible to pull down in order to reveal 
some thought content that is indifferent to its literary 
vehicle. T 
This is precisely the fallacy which fundamentalist theolo-
gians have made in the past, says Ricoeur namely, after 
having legitimately credited to the Bible (or recognized 
within the Bible) a revelatory character, they reduced their 
definition of revelation to the notion of Scripture as dic-
tation or as something whispered into the ear of the tran-
scriber by God. This reduction of the notion of revelation 
is a deprivation, says Ricoeur, of the enrichment which would 
be obiained through a more critical study of the other forms 
of discourse which are not so easily interpreted in terms of 
a voice behind the voice of the author. 2 
In terms of the, text its elf, Ricoeur argues against 
the reduction of revelation to the prophetic genre by 
examining how the other discourse genres present themselves 
as "inspired" or revelatory. He suggests that in biblical 
narratives, unlike the prophetic which have a double author, 
the narrative is presented non-autobiographically, in such a 
1P. Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of 
Revelation," in Essa son Biblical Inter retation, ed. L. S. 
Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, , pp. 0-1. 
2 Ibid., pp. 90-1. 
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way that the author is transparent: as though the events 
recounted themselves. 1 A different theology of revelation 
is needed than the two already described for the very 
different prophetic and narrative genres when we examine the 
prescriptive discourse. By "prescripti.ve" discourse, Ricoeur 
means the legislative texts of the Old Testament. The 
following is an example of the genre of prescription found 
in the Bible: 
You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox or a 
sheep which has a blemish or any defect, for that is a 
detestable thing to the Lord your God. If there , is found 
in your midst, in any of your towns, which the Lord your 
God is giving to you, a man or a woman who does what ii 
evil in the sight of the Lord your God, by transgressing 
His covenant, and has gone and served other gods and 
worshipped them, or the sun or the moon or any of the 
heavenly host, which I have not commanded and if it is 
told you and 2you have heard of it, then you shall inquire thoroughly. 
It is very difficult to ascertain a precise theology of 
revelation for this sort of discourse because the legislative 
utterances themselves are "placed in the mouth of Moses and 
within the narrative framework of the sojourn at Sinai. 113 
Ln a sense, therefore, it is inappropriate to speak of the 
legi~lative discourse as God's tevelation of the law through 
Moses in a typically prophetic fashion, but, rather, "the 
law of a redeemed people." We could of course say the same 
1Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Reve-
lation," p. 77. 
2 Deuteronomy 17: 1-41 (NASB). 
3 Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Reve-
lation," pp. 82-3. 
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for much of what passes as prophetic discourse is that it is 
nearly always the case that God's speech is directly related 
to and appropriate for a people in a certain context. Very 
rarely, in fact does God simply utter to his prophets a word 
that is not acclaimed to the concerns and affairs of either 
the prophet or the prophet's social environment. Ricoeur, 
speaking &gain of prescriptive discourse, maintains that it 
is not possible to eradicate the narrative character of the 
decalogue without doing damage to that particular genre of 
discourse in the biblical text. 
The discourse genre of wisdom literature is more 
difficult to reduce to the prophetic notion of revelation 
than either the narrative or the prescriptive. In the wisdom 
genre, the sage does not even hint that his spe~ch is the 
very speech of God. In opposition to the "dictation" motif 
of prophetic discourse, the sage typically suggests that the 
wisdom which he speaks forth is the effect of meditating upon 
the great narrative of God's interaction with the people of 
Israel and in some senses with all persons from all nations. 
Do not withhold good from those to whom it is due, when 
it is in your power to do it. Do not say to your 
neighbor, "go, and come back, and tomorrow I will give 
it," when · you have it with you. Do not devise harm 
against your neighbor, while he lives in security beside 
you .... For the crooked man is an abomination to the 
Lord; but He is intimate with the upright. 1 
The sage implies that " ..• wisdom precedes him, and, that, 
1 Proverbs, 3: 27-9, 32 (NASB). 
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it is through participation in wisdom that someone may be 
said to be wise. 111 
Finally, hymnic discourse could be described as 
praise addressed to God based upon his prodigious accom-
plishments in the narrative of human understanding. It 
too distinguishes itself as a genre of discourse unique from 
the prophetic in that "It is addressed to God in the second 
person. Without limiting itself to designating him in the 
third as in narration, or to speaking in the first person as 
- 2 
in prophecy." 
Make me know thy ways, 0 Lord;_teach me Thy paths. 
Lead me in Thy truth and teach me, for Thou art 3 the God of my salvation; for Thee I wait all the day. 
Through this analysis of just some of the various 
discourse genres in the biblical text, Ricoeur is attempting 
to make evident the pluralistic and polysemic concept of 
revelation employed in the Scriptures. To accept such a 
thesis, he maintains, is to make yet another stride toward 
the liberation of the text; and this liberation is not onl-y 
one which frees (in a limited sense of course) the text 
from the hermeneutic circle of its origins (from author~s 
intentions, social conditions and the perception of those 
who received it), but as well, from restrictions and 
1 
Riceour, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Reve-
lation," p. 87. 
2 Ibid. , p. 89. 
3 Psalms, 25: 4&5 (NASB). 
91 
prejudices of our own contemporary traditions. It is through 
the literari text that we are enabled to distance ourselves 
from our own horizonal prejudices (at least far enough for 
geniune criticism) and through the biblical text in particu-
lar that we are confronted with the original meanings of our 
human existence. 
With all of this said concerning Ricoeur's view of 
the complex relationship between the biblical text and the 
interpreter, it is not enough. The biblical text itself 
maintains that there is a deficiency in mankind whereby he 
is unable to find the testimony of Christ crucified and 
risen from the grave intellectually credible. Granting 
this biblical notion, Ricoeur pushes yet further to discuss 
the limiting factors within the Western tradition which 
inhibit our capacity and desire to believe, understand, hear 
and participate in the Word of God for Man. 
Overcoming Suspicion 
The great difficulty facing biblical hermeneutics 
as it applies to the hermeneutic circle of the interpreter, 
says Ricoeur, can be summarized in the question, "why are we 
deaf to the Bible today?" In one sense -the society of man-
kind, since explusion from Eden, has been unable to hear the 
Word. In the words of St. Paul, "the preaching of the.Cross 
is folly" for the world (the world both at the time when 
Paul wrote and now). Ricoeur, like Karl Barth, the German 
• 
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nee-orthodox theologian and fideistic apologist, interprets 
Paul's notion of folly to mean that the biblical discourse 
of incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Christ is one 
which has no correspondence with our experience} Since 
the message preached f~ils to correspond, it is unable to 
justify or testify to itself in a manner that is intellec-
tually or intuitively compelling. R~flecting upon this lack 
of correspondence between the testimony of Christianity and 
the experience of modern man, Ricoeur posi~s the biblical 
Word as "the eruption of something from the other side, from 
the totally other in our culture. 112 
In another sense, however~ our ·~strangement from the 
biblical message is more extreme than the estrangement implied 
by the apostle in the term "folly." In his essay entitled 
"Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation," Ricoeur 
locates one reason for the extended estrangement of modern 
man in his loss of sensitivity to the language of symbolism. 
Because of the Cartesian dichotomy between subject as manipu-
lator and object as that which is to be manipulated, we 
perceive ourselves as autonomous inquisitors of the world 
around us. Language is merely a tool employed for interoga-
tion. Univocity in language usage is valued to the point 
1P. Ricoeur, "The Critique of Religion," in The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Reagan and Stewart (Ft. 
Worth: The Texas Christian U. Press, 1978), p. 219. 
2 Ibid., p. 219. 
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that all other usages are held in comtempt. Consequently, 
with such a view of language, it is most difficult for us to 
read the language of Scripture as having to do with reality, 
full as it is with figure, metaphor, vision and myth. 
A second reasoR for the mode~n alienation from the 
language and import of Scripture, suggests Ricoeur, in his 
essay "The Critique of Religion," lies in the influence 
which the triad of thinkers, Marx, Nietzsche, ~;. ,d Freud, 
1 have had upon western culture. Described as "hermeneutists 
of suspicion," they have "taught us to _suspect that reli-
gious language may not mean what it appears to say at all: 
that it may be a coded version of something.else of which we 
would prefer not to be aware. 112 Marx's lasting contribution 
to the history of thought, Ricoeur states, is not his· theory 
of class struggle, but rather his discernment ~f the subtle 
relationship between domination and ideology. His hermeneutic 
of suspicion rendered religion as a sort of encoded language 
of domination and submission. And Nietzsche's contribution 
to both philosophy and philology, which we have already 
mentioned, was his extension of.the rules of exegesis beyond 
the text to culture--because culture, he maintained, is 
itself a text. In Nietzsche's view, the task of philosophy 
is the exegesis, the deciphering of the cloaked signs and 
1Ricoeur, 
2R. icoeur, 
"The Critique of Religion," pp. 213-222. 
Essays on Biblical Interpretation, p. 4. 
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the hidden intentions of the strong and _weak will. The 
impulse of religion was in actuality not God but a form of 
resentment by the weak willed--losers in a contest of power. 
The final thinker of the three hermeneutists of suspicion, 
·Freud, made his major contribution in his analysis of cul-
tural phenomena. " ... The intere .st of Freud is always to 
wonder, faced with a cultural phenomenon how this cultural 
phenomenon pertains to the history of human desire, ... be 
it as a factor of prohibition, of inhibition, of frustration, 
of fear. 111 Iconoclasts, all three, their struggle against 
false consciousness focuses on a critique of religion as 
disguise for domination, hatred, and fearful insecurity. It 
is only in the cautious and meticulous scrutiny of one's be-
liefs in light of their critique of religion, argues Ricoeur 
in much the same fashion as Bonhoeffer, that the faith of 
modern man matures. 
Ricoeur, in his essay "The Language of Faith," refers 
to both ways in which modern man is estranged from the bibli-
cal Word. He speaks of the effects of the Cartesian dicho-
tomy and the hermeneutic of suspicion as "the de-construction 
of the assurances of modern man. 112 Beyond the destruction 
done to our capacity to b~lieve; as it were, the unbelievable, 
1Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Rico~ur, p. 217. 
2P. Ricoeur, uThe Language of Faith," in The Philo-
sophy of P. Ricoeur, ed. Reagan and Stewart (Ft. Woith: 
The Texas Christain U. Press, 1978), pp. 223-238. 
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Ricoeur suggests that de-construction leads thi way to re-
construction. Such a re-construction is begun when, in 
response to the hermeneutics of suspicion, we employ suspi-
cion ourselves in order to inspect critically those traits 
which characterize our own cultural hermeneutic circle. 
Interestingly, Ricoeur does not turn upon the critique of 
religion provided by the hermeneutics of suspicion with 
suspicion. He appears genuinely to accept their criticisms 
and allows this recognition to alter the approach which he 
takes toward the interpretation of Scripture. He states 
that, 
I think that any modern hermeneutics is a hermeneutics 
with a double edge and a double function. It is an 
effort to struggle against idols, . and, consequently, 
it is destructive. It is a critique of ideologies 
in the sense of Marx; it is a critique of all flights 
and evasions into other worlds in the sense of Nietzsche-; 
a struggle against childhood fables and against securing 
illusions in the sense of phychoanalysis ... Long ago 
this was the task of the second Isaiah when he tied the 
preaching of Yahweh to the flight against the 1 Baals, and consequently joined iconoclasm to preaching. 
He does, however, turn with suspicion toward the influence 
which "Cartesian" philosophy has had upon the process of 
secularization. Principally, Ricoeur challenges the pre-
supposition that it is the task not only of the logician but 
in fact of all who employ language· to "struggle against 
equivocation, to struggle against double meaning, in a way 
1 R" 1coeur, "The Language of Faith," p. 224. 
2 Ibid., pp. 234-5. 
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that perfects a language which is perfectly uni vocal. i, 1 
This attitude, as represented in the quote, toward language 
has the effect of extending or at least attempting to pro~ 
vide a rational explanation for all areas of human thought. 
In a sense, therefore, this brings about a reduction--espe-
cially in the area of theology--from the "mysterious" to the 
· - "problematic. 112 From Ricoeur' s per spec ti ve, to accept uni-
voc i ty as the goal to strive for in language usage is com-
pletely necessary for the logician. The coherency of any 
argument depends upon the consistency of meaning. However, 
if one is unwilling to accept a "monolythic concept of reve-
lation" wherein all forms of biblical discourse are inter-
preted as being propositional, then one's position regarding 
language must allow for the possibility of multivocal signi-
f . t· 3 1.ca ions. 
Ricoeur is unwilling to accept a notion of revelation 
which prescribes that all of biblical discourse is to be 
interpreted as propositional in nature. The acceptance of 
such a position, he maintains, is the common mistake of those 
who accept a unified theory of revelation (which we have 
already discussed).: one which assumes that all of revelation 
is to modeled after prophetic discourse. 
1 . 
Ricoeur, "The .Language of Faith," p. 233. 
2 rbid., p. 225. 
3 Ibid. , p. 233. 
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There are two types of equivocation in our language . 
usage, maintains Ricoeur, "there is equivocation by de-
fault, by vacillation of the meaning ... and an equivo-
cation due to an excess of meaning. 111 In the case of the 
former, the logician is the one who battles against equi~ 
vocation for the sake of cogency in argumentation. The 
equivocate is for the logician to fail. In the latter case, 
Ricoeur maintains that equivocation is unavoidable. This 
unavoidability is due to the kinds of language usages repre-
sented in both symbolic and ' the broad, diverse usages in 
ordinary language. Referring to Ricoeur's position concern-
ing ordinary language, L. Dornisch states, "Ordinary language 
has an incurable ambiguity, amphibious construction, and a 
confusion inherent in idiomatic expressions and in meta-
phor.112 Ricoeur appears to be arguing that over the course 
of the history of mankind's ~xistence language has become 
supersaturated with meaning. Like the many sidedness of 
symbols, ordinary language bursts with multiple possible 
renderings. Thus, it is the work of the hermeneutist, as 
opposed to the logician, to recall the richness of meaning 
to language. In one sense, by remembering the multiple 
possibilities of word meaning, one obscures and makes the 
1 Ricoeur, "The · Languag .e of Faith," p. 234. 
2 P. Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, in "Semia: An 
Experimental Journal for Biblical Criticism," 1975, no. 4, 
27-148. 
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task of interpr~tation more difficult; In another sense, 
says ' Ricoeur, not only does it enhance the language of man 
and allows one to transcend the reductive limitations of 
contemporary secularism, but also it frees man to hea~ again 
a more "original and primal word. 111 "To let speak a language 
which though addressed to us we hear no longer, which though 
·. 2 
spoken to us we can no longer ·speak." 
Ricoeur speaks of the "liberation of the significant 
potential held in suspense in the myth" as the "second 
naivete." The first naivete is lost forever as a possi-
bility for modern man due to the necessary suspicion with 
which we must approach the masked motives of our private, 
social and religious existence. A second naivete, however, 
is possible following the application of suspicion toward 
all unduly restrictive limitations present in the traditions 
of our age, and by allowing the text itself via its particular 
discourse genres to direct us in the ways it should be inter-
preted. A second naivete is possible through a hermeneutic 
which ·exposes _and explores the multivocal significations 
of language and in particular, myth. When this occurs, 
modern man will be enabled to hear and be confronted once 
again with the "folly of the Cross" without all of the 
restrictive intellectual prejudices of his age. In a culture 
1Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Ricoeur, p. 235. 
2 Ibid., p. 235. 
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which has abandoned myth and employs language as a tool 
alone, the Scriptures speak but cannot be heard or believed. 
Hermeneutics, suggests Ricoeur, establishes a context for 
the . world of the text and the world of the interpreter to 
converge and the reader understand once again. 
CONCLUSION 
The format of this thesis has actually been quite 
simple. Beginning with the structures of human action 
intentionality, teleology and historicity, we proceeded to 
construct a philosophical account of narrative understanding 
which would take these into consideration when endeavoring 
to interpret actions or their consequents such as texts. 
We concluded with ' an application of such a hermeneutic 
philosophy to the biblical text. Unfortunately, the com-
plexity of our discussion often obfuscated the simplicity of 
our project. In this thesis we have re-considered the 
plausibility, in light of various alternatives, of inter-
preting human actions and symbols . on the basis of the agent's 
own .description and experience. In so doing we discovered 
that such actions are temporally complex involving many . 
layers of meaning. Letters like Erasmus', have meanings 
which extend far beyond the original. Analysis of the recipro-
cal relationship between the part and the whole (the hermeneu-
tic and double hermeneutic circle), has led us to discover 
that a longer term narrative account of an action lends to a 
deeper understanding of what a particular action means over 




What has been surprising about the development of 
this thesis and in gineral the overall direction which 
hermeneutic philosophy is presently taking, is the flexi-
bility (applicability) of narrative understanding not onli 
for history, literary criticism and theology but virtually 
every discipline in which human action is evident. This 
thesis hopefully contributes to the development of a better 
balanced integration of the approaches employed in the 
human sciences by carefully examining the most basic com-
ponents of human action and initiating the development of a 
hermeneutic which is responsive to those same components. 
Perhaps the aspect of this thesis which has been most 
original has been the careful attempt to allow both the 
plurivocal meaning of actions and expressions in the human 
world to remain in tension with a notion of both the ideal 
narrator and the ideal narrative. In the context of such a 
tension relativism is constrained while the ontological 
structures of human rational action and its consequents 
remain fundamental for philosophy as well as the interpre-
tive •disciplines that seek to uriderstand the human world. 
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